

# THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

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## Notes of Recent Exposition.

MANY are the interpretations of Jn 16<sup>s-11</sup>, but not one of them has given general satisfaction. Mr. W. H. P. HATCH tries another.

The difficulty is with the verb. In the Authorized Version it is translated 'reprove'—'he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment.' But to reprove the world of righteousness, or even of judgment, requires explanation. The margin of the Authorized Version, however, has a more likely word: 'or convince,' it says. If that word 'convince' had its modern meaning the difficulty would almost be removed. He will convince the world of [the reality of] sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment—that is sense enough, and very good sense. And the probability is that that is the meaning which the ordinary reader takes out of it and is content. But that meaning will not do.

For the verb so translated does not mean convince. It means 'convict.' The Revisers render the eighth verse literally and accurately: 'And he, when he is come, will convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgement.' And we are back again with the old difficulty.

The difficulty, when you give the verb its proper meaning, is with 'righteousness.' Mr. HATCH,

who writes in *The Harvard Review*, sees that. He sees that to convict the world of sin is intelligible enough; but to convict the world of righteousness, which is the very opposite of sin, is not intelligible.

But *is* righteousness the very opposite of sin? Not always. The word rendered righteousness here is sometimes rendered justice. It is rendered so even here by the Rheims translators, after the Vulgate *justitia*. For it has sometimes the meaning of righteousness or moral excellence, and sometimes the meaning of justification or acquittal. Take the latter meaning here. Then, says Mr. HATCH, 'the world will be brought to recognise three things by the power of the Paraclete: First, that it has sinned because it has not believed in Christ; second, that believers are justified or acquitted because Christ has gone to the Father to act as their advocate; and third, that evil has been condemned because the ruler of this world (the devil) has been condemned.'

Are we out of the wood now? By no means. 'Brought to recognise' is just the old and impossible 'convince' over again.

A volume of sermons of quite unusual interest, and of quite unusual ability, has been published



by Messrs. Hodges & Figgis, under the title of *The Downfall of Satan* (5s.). The author is the Rev. J. E. HUTTON, M.A., of the Moravian Church in Dublin.

The Downfall of Satan is the subject of the first sermon. The text is Lk 10<sup>18</sup>, 'I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.' It is a text that has awakened the curiosity of the most careless reader and has occupied the thought of the most attentive student, and the one has taken about as much out of it as the other. Mr. HUTTON believes that the failure is due to lack of the historical imagination.

He has no doubt that the disciples understood what Jesus meant. They had certain ideas about Satan. Jesus took these ideas into account. And they had a way of speaking of the future which also He accepted and made use of. What were these ideas and what was that way of speaking?

The way of speaking—Mr. HUTTON takes it first—was to represent the future as if it were the past. Jesus adopted that way of speaking. 'Your work,' He said, as the Seventy returned with joy, 'is only a beginning. There are far grander things in store for you; some day Satan, the Prince of the Demons, will fall. I have had a vision of the good time coming. I have looked ahead into the golden future. I have seen Satan himself fall as lightning from heaven.'

Mr. HUTTON says that it is common for preachers to speak in that way. We are not sure that it is common. But it occurs. It is more common with poets than with preachers. And it is to a poet that Mr. HUTTON goes for his example. In 'Locksley Hall' Tennyson 'puts his prophecy into the form of a vision, and says that he himself actually saw what was about to take place. He saw the airmen fighting in the air:

"For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see,

Saw the vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be;

Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails,

Pilots of the purple twilight, dropping down with costly bales;

Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rained a ghastly dew

From the nations' airy navies grappling in the central blue;

Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm,

With the standards of the peoples plunging through the thunder-storm;

Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and the battle-flags were furled

In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World."

Then Mr. HUTTON turns to Satan. What were the ideas which the disciples of Jesus had about Satan?

The first idea was that he is a political tyrant. Where did they get that idea? They got it from the prophecies of the Book of Zechariah. There Satan is 'a barrister defending the cause of tyranny.' The question of the day was between Church and State. 'Should men be free to worship God according to the dictates of conscience, or should the State decide what every man should believe and teach? Should there, in a word, be religious liberty or should there be State tyranny? The people were divided into two parties. On the side of religious liberty stood Zechariah, assisted by Joshua, the High Priest; on the side of tyranny, Satan, the clever lawyer: that is Satan's first appearance on the stage of human history. The prophet described the situation in a vision. The scene is a Court of Justice. The Judge on the throne is God; the



prisoner at the bar is Joshua, the High Priest, clad in filthy garments; the prosecuting counsel is Satan; and Satan argues like tyrants the wide world over. As the Jews suffer, it is clear God does not love them; therefore they cannot know Him first hand; and therefore the State must regulate religion for them. The verdict was given by God. The wicked barrister received a stern rebuke; the prisoner's filthy robes were taken from him; then he was given new fine robes, and a diadem crowned his head; and God Himself laid down the sacred principle that henceforth each man should worship according to his conscience.'

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'What, then, did Jesus mean when He said, "I saw Satan as lightning fall from heaven"? He was predicting the downfall of political tyranny. For that cause of religious liberty our fathers shed their blood; for that cause their noble sons died on the plains of Flanders. The first need of the soul is freedom: freedom to seek and to proclaim the truth.'

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The next idea of Satan held by the disciples of Jesus was that he is a cynical philosopher. They got that idea in the Book of Job. Mr. HUTTON quotes the passage from the first chapter of the Book of Job. We need not quote it here. Satan 'has no belief in human virtue; there is, he informs us, no such thing as unselfish heroism. No one, he says, will be religious unless he finds that it pays; no soldier fights except for what he can get; and no one does a kind deed except for a reward. And now a modern Satan informs us that this vile law applies to nations. According to the German historian Treitschke, the duty of every nation is to be selfish; no nation has any right to risk her life for another; and, therefore, when England rushed to the help of Belgium she was either a hypocrite or a fool. In plain English, Satan was a brutal cynic.'

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Mr. HUTTON finds the best definition of the cynic in Oscar Wilde. A cynic 'is "a man who knows the price of everything and the value of

nothing." He knows the price for which a man will work, and he does not know the value of the soul. According to Satan, all men's motives are selfish; according to Jesus, a selfish man may, by Divine grace, be made unselfish; and that is what He meant when He said, "I saw Satan as lightning fall from heaven."'

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Another idea of the disciples about Satan was that he is a tempter. That idea they found in Chronicles, where they read that Satan tempted David to number Israel. Very likely the idea was fostered by our Lord, if by this time He had told the story of His own Temptation. In any case that was the thought of Satan which of all others they left as a legacy to the Church. And Christ looked forward to the temptations which His followers would have to meet, and the victories which they would gain. He looked forward to Peter's temptation and the prayer, 'I prayed for thee that thy faith fail not,' to Paul's temptation, so hopelessly strong at the first, so gloriously overcome at the last. 'Thanks be unto God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.'

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One other idea the disciples had about Satan. He was the origin of bodily suffering, the author of disease. And here Mr. HUTTON boldly ranges himself with the disciples. 'The Christian Scientist says there is no disease; the New Testament calls it a Satanic reality; and, being Satanic in nature, it must come down. What, for example, did Jesus mean when He said that Satan had bound a certain woman for eighteen years (Luke xiii. 16)? He meant that she had chronic paralysis or rheumatism. St. Paul spoke in the same way. He called his disease "a messenger of Satan to buffet me"; he wrote to his friends at Salonika, "I would have come to you, but Satan hindered me"; and what he really meant was, "I had a touch of malaria." In that sense, Satan has still much power in those regions.'

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'For all true Christians, therefore, the future is



bright. The future is in the hands of Christ, and He sees what is coming. The power of political tyranny is coming down; the power of the brutal cynic is coming down; the power of sin in the soul is coming down; the power of disease is coming down; and all those who fight on the right side will receive a glorious reward.'

The Rev. E. Aldom FRENCH still believes in the preaching of the Gospel. Put the emphasis on Gospel. It is the old use of the word, now quite and even quaintly out of date. He believes in—what did our fathers call them?—evangelistic services. He even believes in revivals. In *Evangelism: A Re-interpretation* he has edited nine addresses by nine earnest men, all of the same belief (Epworth Press; 4s. net).

Now the evangelism that those nine men believe in involves two assumptions. First, that all men are dead in trespasses and sins (excuse the antiquated phraseology); and next, that there is power in the preaching of the Gospel to make them live. Are these assumptions true?

One thing is certain. Those nine men are not fools—Campbell Morgan, Robertson Nicoll, Samuel Chadwick, A. S. Peake, H. B. Workman, George Eayrs, Spencer Watkins, Elvet Lewis, Aldom French—they are not fools; and they are not alone. Are they entitled to assume that all men are dead in trespasses and in sins? That is their first, their fundamental, assumption. Can it be made good?

The first question is, When are men dead? Are they born dead? Or do they die afterwards? If you decide that men are not born dead, you are still entitled to say that all men are dead in trespasses and in sins. They may die through their own deliberate will. For to be dead is to be out of touch with God. As Drummond told us long ago, it is a matter of atmosphere. The plant or animal is dead that is out of correspond-

ence with its environment, that environment which is necessary to its sustenance—fresh air, proper food. A man, even a child, may put himself out of touch with God by doing wrong. But that comes after birth. Are we out of touch with God when we are born?

'I'll tell you,' says Dr. John Brown (it is the beloved physician, who wrote of Rab and his Friends)—'I'll tell you,' he says, 'where all the babies come from; *they all come from God*; His hand made and fashioned them; He breathed into their nostrils the breath of life—of His life. He said, "Let this little child be," and it was.' We agree. But with what endowment did it come? There are three interpretations. Poetry says with Heaven all about it. Theology says burdened with the sin of the race. Science says without any other endowment than certain faculties or instincts, which serve for good or evil only when the will consents.

First, Poetry. And first, Wordsworth—

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:  
The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,  
Hath had elsewhere its setting,  
And cometh from afar:  
Not in entire forgetfulness,  
And not in utter nakedness,  
But trailing clouds of glory do we come  
From God, who is our home:  
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!  
Shades of the prison-house begin to close  
Upon the growing Boy,  
But He beholds the light, and whence it flows,  
He sees it in his joy;  
The Youth, who daily farthest from the east  
Must travel, still is Nature's Priest,  
And by the vision splendid  
Is on his way attended;  
At length the Man perceives it die away,  
And fade into the light of common day.

But the thought is not original to Wordsworth.



Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch will take you back to John Earle and Henry Vaughan, and further back still to George Herbert, of whom Henry Vaughan was a learner, and to Thomas Traherne, who learned of both Herbert and Vaughan. Traherne has it both in poetry and in prose, and his prose is as poetical as his poetry. In poetry thus—

How like an Angel came I down!  
 How bright are all things here!  
 When first among His works I did appear  
 O how their Glory me did crown!  
 The world resembled His Eternity  
 In which my soul did walk;  
 And everything that I did see  
 Did with me talk.

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And then in prose—‘Those pure and virgin apprehensions I had in my infancy, and that divine light wherewith I was born, are the best unto this day wherein I can see the universe. By the gift of God they attended me into the world, and by His special favour I remember them till now. Certainly Adam in Paradise had not more sweet and curious apprehensions of the world than I when I was a child.’

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Then comes Wordsworth. And then Hood—

I remember, I remember,  
 The fir trees dark and high;  
 I used to think their slender tops  
 Were close against the sky:  
 It was a childish ignorance,  
 But now 'tis little joy  
 To know I'm farther off from heav'n  
 Than when I was a boy.

And then Whittier—

We wander wide through evil years,  
 Our eyes of faith grow dim;  
 But he is freshest from His hands  
 And nearest unto Him!

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And then the succession passes to two quite modern poets, Percy Ainsworth (of whom, had he

been a poet only and not also a preacher and a greater preacher than a poet, another Shelley might have written another ‘Adonais’), and A. E. (the chief of the Irish and some say of all the poets of our day). This is Ainsworth—

Still to gentle hands is left the task of waking  
 Children dreaming in the glamour of the  
 dawn

To the lurid day, where hearts are nigh to  
 breaking

For the fairy joys, so simple in the making,  
 That are gone.

Very slowly o'er the Eastern light comes creep-  
 ing

A faint shadow that shall deepen by and  
 by;

And ye know not that there passeth from your  
 keeping

That for which your heart will hunger when  
 the weeping-

Time draws nigh.

Be ye thankful if the swift-spiced days but weave  
 you

Blooms of heart's-ease 'mid the cypress and  
 the thorn;

If the hours that bring a message that must  
 grieve you

Shall but tell their tale and pass away—nor  
 leave you

Quite forlorn.

And this is A. E.—

How far apart are I and you,  
 Beloved, from those spirit children who  
 Felt but one single Being long ago,  
 Whispering in gentleness and leaning low  
 Out of its majesty, as child to child.

I think upon it all with heart grown wild.  
 Hearing no voice, howe'er my spirit broods,  
 No whisper from the dense infinitudes,  
 This world of myriad things whose distance  
 awes.

Ah me; how innocent our childhood was!



Now before passing to the theological and the scientific interpretations let us see if this poetical view of the state of infancy is left unchallenged.

Archbishop Temple does not challenge it. He accepts the innocence of childhood, finding 'something sacred' in it. 'The purity,' he says, 'which has been kept clean, not that which has been made clean, always seems to have a peculiar unearthly lustre.' And he holds that though the sinner who repents reaches a higher degree of purity, it is not the same kind of purity. For 'nothing else can quite replace the simple attachment which binds the innocent heart to the loving Saviour, and the grown Christian clings with earnest longing to whatever fragment of childlike innocence still remains to him. And as he grows older there is no temptation which cuts him with deeper pain than one which solicits him to do a wrong thing which he never recollects having done before.'

Nor does Stevenson challenge the poetical estimate of childhood. But he challenges the idea that the child's heaven passes away into the common day of manhood. 'The regret we have for our childhood is not wholly justifiable: so much a man may lay down without fear of public ribaldry; for although we shake our heads over the change, we are not unconscious of the manifold advantages of our new state. What we lose in generous impulse we more than gain in the habit of generously watching others; and the capacity to enjoy Shakespeare may balance a lost appetite for playing at soldiers.'

And Ruskin challenges it more decidedly. 'No line of modern poetry,' he says, 'has been oftener quoted with thoughtless acceptance than Wordsworth's:

Heaven lies about us in our infancy.

It is wholly untrue in the implied limitation; if life be led under heaven's law, the sense of heaven's nearness only deepens with advancing

years, and is assured in death. But the saying is indeed true thus far, that in the dawn of virtuous life every enthusiasm and every perception may be trusted as of divine appointment; and the *maxima reverentia* is due not only to the innocence of children, but to their inspiration. And it follows that through the ordinary course of mortal failure and misfortune, in the career of nations no less than of men, the error of their intellect, and the hardening of their hearts, may be accurately measured by their denial of spiritual power. In the life of Scott, beyond comparison the greatest intellectual force manifested in Europe since Shakespeare, the lesson is given us with a clearness as sharp as the incision on a Greek vase. The very first mental effort for which he obtained praise was the passionate recitation of the passage in the *Æneid*, in which the ghost of Hector appears to Æneas. And the deadliest sign of his own approaching death is in the form of incredulity which dictated to his weary hand the *Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft*.'

Fitzgerald, however, wholly denies the existence of Wordsworth's heavenly child. He discusses the matter in *Euphranor*:

'I know not yet whether I have ever had an Infant Hero of any kind to deal with; none, certainly, who gave any indication of any such "clouds of glory" as your Wordsworth tells of, even when just arrived from their several homes—in Alexander's case, of a somewhat sulphureous nature, according to Skythrope, I doubt. No, nor of any young Wordsworth neither under our diviner auspices.

"Nay, but," said Euphranor, "he tells us that our Birth is but a 'Sleep and a Forgetting' of something which must take some waking-time to develop."

"But which, if I remember aright, is to begin to darken 'with shades of the Prison-house,' as Wordsworth calls it, that begin to close about 'the growing Boy.' But I am too much of a Philistine, as you Germans have it, to comprehend the Transcendental. All I know is, that I have



not yet detected any signs of the 'Heaven that lies about our Infancy,' nor for sometime after—no, not even peeping through those windows through which the Soul is said more immediately to look, but as yet with no more speculation in them than those of the poor whelp of the Dog we talked of—in spite of a nine days' start of him."

And the experience of teachers and coachmen is on Fitzgerald's side. In the Life of William Alexander, Archbishop of Dublin and Primate of All Ireland, we read that there was 'a remarkable coachman called Jimmy. He evidently had no excessive veneration for his master. In fact, he was more than once heard to say—"Experience teaches fools, and if his Lordship does what he's thinkin' on, he'll larn." On one occasion the Bishop was giving away prizes at a school—it was on the Festival of the Holy Innocents, and he spoke with feeling of the beauty of innocent childhood, their trailing clouds of glory, and so forth. "Childer is just wee botherations, so they are," floated in from where the carriage waited. "The horses will tramp you, without you quit yer capers—ye limbs of Satan."

Pass to the theological view of infancy. The theological view is that the child is by nature sinful. The Rev. Thomas Stephens, who edited a volume of essays by many and various writers on *The Child and Religion*, summed up the matter in this way: 'There have been dogmatic developments of the theological idea which have had to be rejected. Theologians have exaggerated and elaborated, and so have made the thought repugnant. But still, the derived sinful bias of human nature is a fact, not a dogma. "A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit." Serious observers have recognised that the "taint" is transmitted. Only a superficial view of humanity or an inadequate conception of morality can jauntily say that "all children are born good." The modern view of things is marked by an even stronger sense than in former days of the reality and universal presence of sin. The flimsy optim-

ism which led men to regard this as the best of all worlds, and to make light of the facts which contradicted their pleasing hypothesis, has vanished. To-day there is even an oppressive sense of the weight of the sin which burdens humanity. We have disposed of the shallow views of Rousseau respecting the inherent goodness of children, and have ceased to dream of a perfectibility based on education, and on altered social and political conditions. Pelagian views of human nature are discredited. Kant's deeper and truer note is accepted, and we are forced to acknowledge the presence of a radical evil.'

The theological view of the nature of children is obtained from Scripture, but it is supported by observation. Take observation first, and take so untraditional a theologian as Mr. F. R. Tennant. 'The child nature,' says Mr. Tennant, 'is always characterised by what, in older persons, would be described as faults and vices. Young children are invariably very impatient of godly restraint and discipline; they exhibit a passionateness of temper, a wilfulness, a greed, an unconscious cruelty, and a capacity for unrestrained self-pleasing, which serve to convince the majority of minds that there is indeed much of the old Adam in human nature from the first. "Can you possibly doubt the doctrine of original sin," the present writer was once asked by a mother, and again by a theologian with experience of Sunday Schools, "if you have ever had anything to do with children?"'

Take again so unfettered a theologian as Bishop G. A. Chadwick: 'The theological dogma of original sin, however unwelcome to many, is in harmony with all experience. Impatience is there, and many a childish fault; and graver evils develop as surely as life unfolds, just as weeds show themselves in summer, the germs of which were already mingled with the better seed in spring. It is plain to all observers that the weeds of human nature are latent in the early soil, that this is not pure at the beginning of each individual life.'



But it is in Scripture that the doctrine is discovered. The passages are familiar and need no repetition here. These passages are accepted by the great majority of theologians, Roman and Protestant, as decisive. And decisive on two things—both guilt and depravity.

They are decisive on original guilt. The chief passage of Scripture is Ro 5<sup>12-18</sup>. 'Whatever obscurities lie in it, its main tenor is considered to be clear—St. Paul is proving the guilt of all men, young and old, from the fact that all men suffer the penalty of guilt, to wit, death. It is an argument from the effect to the cause, from the universality of the punishment to the universality of the guilt. Children, who have not sinned according to the similitude of Adam's transgression, die. If they die, thus suffering the penalty of sin, they must have sinned—sinned in a pre-temporal state according to Origen, in a super-temporal state according to Julius Müller, in Adam according to the evangelical divines. Accordingly, all children are born in a state of guilt, and consequently of condemnation.'

They are equally decisive on the depravity. 'No phrase,' says Dr. J. Cynddylan Jones in *The Child and Religion*, 'has been more prominent in the discussion of this subject than that of "total depravity." What did Augustine, Calvin, and their equally able followers intend by it? Evidently that man by nature is destitute of all goodness, and has in him the seed of all vice. The Westminster Confession, the standard of orthodoxy in Calvinistic churches, teaches that our first parents "became dead in sins and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body," and that "they convey the same death in sin and corrupted nature to all their posterity." The (United) Free Church of Scotland recently receded from that extreme position, making "total depravity" to mean, not total in intensity, but total in extent, i.e. that no part of our nature has escaped the contagion of evil. According to the modern interpretation it does not signify that human nature

because of original sin is as bad as it might possibly be, but that in every faculty it has been tainted with badness.'

It follows from the guilt and depravity in which children are born that they must be 'born again' if they are to enjoy fellowship with God. Says Bishop Moule: 'Such is the damage wrought by that deep mystery we call the Fall, so sore a break of continuity in the filial attitude does it bring, that Scripture seems plainly to speak of a regeneration as necessary for every human being if it is to enjoy that sonship which is to be sonship indeed. It seems to me clear that the New Testament, in the vast majority of passages, when it speaks of "children of God" (and similar phrases), speaks of human beings who have been thus regenerated.' And the Rev. John Lewis, a Baptist, in the same useful handbook, says: 'I cannot see how anyone can be in the kingdom until he is old enough to exercise his own choice, and has by an act of faith and love surrendered to Christ. I believe this choice, which from the human side we call conversion, is possible at a very early age, and often takes place before the subject of it is fully conscious of everything that has happened. It should be expected in very little children, who can often understand what sin is and what forgiveness means far better than many suppose, and should be regarded as the normal experience of child life in every household where the little ones are brought, not to any ceremony, but to the living Christ, in prayer and faith.'

Pass to the scientific view. 'What do psychologists, who have studied the infant mind, find to be the constitution of human experience during the first epoch of mental life? No one, of course, believes now, if indeed anyone did in Locke's time, in innate ideas. There is no such complex furniture in the infant's mind at birth as the general idea; even what Kant called the forms of intuition, space and time, modern psychology has shown to be the outcome of elaborate synthesis. The



infant's experience begins in raw sensations, feelings of pleasure and pain, and the motor adaptations to which these lead. With these, and with the latent germs of the faculties of perception and thought, which cannot be observed but which must be assumed in order to account for the development of the child into the man, we have no concern. There remain only the congenital instincts and appetites.'

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On these instincts and appetites we may quote Sir Henry Jones. He is very clear and he is very emphatic. They are not to be regarded as sinful. They 'are not actual tendencies in any direction, but *potential faculties*.' 'There is no room for doubt that a degenerate parentage brings weakened offspring; or that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. But in every other sense, except that of varying capacities awaiting realisation by actual contact with circumstance, each child is a new beginning; the way to virtue is as open to the child of the wicked as it is to the child of the virtuous. The whole stress, therefore, falls upon the environment, and above all else upon the social environment, into which from birth the child enters.'

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Addressing the new-born infant, Longfellow as a poet can say:

Here at the portal thou dost stand,  
And with thy little hand  
Thou openest the mysterious gate  
Into the future's undiscovered land.

And science can accept the poetry as scientifically true.

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But scientific observers are not always all of one mind. At the present moment a keen controversy is raging between the believers in environment and the believers in heredity. There are those who deny the white-paper theory, as they call it. Children are not born as a sheet of white paper is laid on the desk to be by and by written upon by

the outside influence of their surroundings. They are born with hereditary tendencies. These tendencies may be for good or for ill, but they are there and they have to be reckoned with. 'A child may inherit from vicious or dissolute parents a disposition to evil. It matters not, we are told, what influences may be brought to bear upon it, sooner or later the original strain will manifest itself in act. The vicious life breaks out in due time almost as surely as oak leaves upon an oak tree. And so strong is this conviction, so fully does it seem to be maintained by evidence gathered from all quarters of the animal kingdom, that it has been a main obstacle in the way of one of the most desirable and promising of social reforms—the adoption as members of the family of the derelict waifs of the great cities. The fear of hereditary predisposition paralyses the benevolent, and paralyses them the more, the more they place value upon character. They cannot face the risk of twining their affections around children who may have brought with them into the world the tendencies which destroyed their parents.'

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My child is mine.

Blood of my blood, flesh of my flesh is he,  
Rocked on my breast and nurtured at my  
knee,  
Fed with sweet thoughts ere ever he drew  
breath,  
Wrested in battle through the gates of death.  
With passionate patience is my treasure  
hoarded,  
And all my pain with priceless joy rewarded.

My child is mine.

Nay, but a thousand thousand powers of ill  
Dispute him with me: lurking wolf-like still  
In every covert of the ambushed years.  
Disease and danger dog him: foes and fears  
Bestride his path, with menace fierce and  
stormy.  
Help me, O God! these are too mighty  
for me!



Now of those three interpretations which is the true one? The first undoubtedly. The Poet is a seer. He looks into the heart of things. And when he expresses truly what he truly sees, that is the truth for us. If, instead of declaring his vision he reasons and reflects upon it, he may go wrong. Wordsworth may be wrong when he says that the youth must daily travel further from the east. For he is then speaking as a theologian rather than as a poet, and agrees with the theologian who says, 'No mere man since the Fall is able in this life perfectly to keep the commandments of God, but doth daily break them, in thought, word, and deed.' With that, however, we have nothing at present to do. Our business is with the child. And it is true that heaven lies about us in our infancy.

It is true as an ideal, as all poetic truth is. The reality is often far otherwise. The literal truth is that hell lies about the infancy of some children. That is one of the problems of our time, one of its greatest and most urgent problems. The problem is how to turn the hell of so many an infancy—a hell which is due to man—into the heaven which God intended it to be. But the ideal of the poet is also often realized. In many a home heaven lies about the children's early years, and many a man has been able in after years to thank God for it.

But the theological interpretation is not all wrong. Many modern theologians are ready to abandon the doctrine of original sin, and among laymen it seems to carry so little sense of reality that congregations are apt to smile at the mention

of it. But it is one of the few attempts of individualistic theology to get a solidaristic view of its field of work. The doctrine of original sin views the race as a great unity, descended from a single head, and knit together through all ages by common unity of origin and blood. This natural unity is the basis and carrier for the transmission and universality of sin. Depravity of will and corruption of nature are transmitted wherever life itself is transmitted.

And science agrees. Evil, as well as good, says the scientific observer, flows 'down the generations through the channels of biological coherence. Idiocy and feeble-mindedness, neurotic disturbances, weakness of inhibition, perverse desires, stubbornness and anti-social impulses in children must have had their adequate biological causes somewhere back on the line, even if we lack the records.'

The poet is right. Heaven lies about us in our infancy. Jesus was a poet and He said so. 'Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not; for of such is the kingdom of heaven.' And the theologian is right also. For even when they come to the Saviour, and at however early an age they come, they are already weighted with the inheritance of the race. They are bone of their fathers' bone. They are flesh of his flesh. They are soul of his soul and spirit of his spirit. They cannot be, without being human; and humanity has in it something of the brute, if you speak after the manner of science and evolution, something of the Fall, if you speak, more reverently, of the will of God and highest hope.



## Two Passages in the Psalms.

BY THE VENERABLE R. H. CHARLES, D.D., D.LITT., F.B.A., ARCHDEACON OF WESTMINSTER.

IN this article I propose to emend two corrupt passages in the Psalms, 2<sup>11.12</sup> 119<sup>85</sup>.

Ps 2<sup>11.12</sup>.—The fourth strophe (2<sup>10-12</sup>) of this Psalm reads as follows, according to the Massoretic text:

2<sup>10</sup> Now therefore be wise, O ye kings:  
Be instructed, ye judges of the earth.  
11 Serve the Lord with fear,  
And rejoice with trembling. 12 Kiss the son  
Lest he be angry, and ye perish in the way,  
For his wrath will soon be kindled.  
Blessed are all they that put their trust in him.

In the above strophe scholars are practically agreed that the fourth line is corrupt. I have italicized the words that cannot stand.

Let us consider shortly the objections to the Massoretic text, and first as to the word 'rejoice.' 'Rejoice' cannot be used as a parallel to 'serve' in the preceding line. Hence most modern scholars deal summarily with it and either excise it, as Cheyne, Duhm, Buhl, etc., or emend גילו, as Ewald, into חילו.

Next, the phrase 'kiss the son' is wholly unsatisfactory. Both the Semitic words נשקו בר in this phrase are difficult. Let us deal with the second first. The word בר in the sense of 'son' is impossible. For (1°) it is an Aramaic word, and its occurrence instead of the Hebrew בן, which the author has used already in 2<sup>7</sup>, is unaccountable. 2°. The absence of the article is inexplicable if the word refers to the same person as 'my son' in 2<sup>7</sup>, where of course it is clearly defined. 3°. The rendering of בר by 'son' is not found in the LXX and Targum (i.e. παιδείας and אולפנא), which appear to presuppose another reading. The misinterpretation of בר as 'son' is due to Syriac and Aramaic influence.<sup>1</sup> It is not found in Aquila or Symmachus, whose respective renderings ἐκλεκτός and καθαρῶς presuppose בר, which is to be derived from quite a different root. 4°. As in line five above, 'Lest he be angry,' as well as in lines three, six, and seven, it is God Himself that is referred to and not the Son of God, so it is not the Son of God nor any other being than God that can be mentioned

in line four. The entire strophe refers to God alone.

Hence we conclude that the Aramaic word בר = 'son' cannot be original in 2<sup>12</sup>.

We have next to study נשקו. There are several difficulties connected with the use of this word here in the sense of 'to kiss,' i.e. 'to worship.' 1°. Duhm with considerable justice argues that this meaning cannot be inferred from 1 S 10<sup>1</sup> or the cultic use of the term in 1 K 19<sup>18</sup>, Hos 13<sup>2</sup>, Job 31<sup>27</sup>. 2°. The LXX, Targum, and Vulgate agree in a different rendering (i.e. δράξασθε, קבילו and apprehendite respectively). Aquila and Symmachus render it respectively by καταφιλήσατε and προσκυνήσατε, but assign a different meaning to בר, as we have seen above. 3°. Hardly any modern scholar accepts נשקו. It is taken either to be corrupt or to be an interpolation. Briggs retains it, but emends בר.

Thus since practically all the ancient versions are at variance as to the meaning of both words in the phrase נשקו בר, and since most modern scholars are at one in regarding this phrase as corrupt or in rejecting it as an interpolation, the question may well be asked: Is there any hope of recovering the original text of line four? The present writer believes that it can be recovered by means of careful emendation, which does full justice (a) to the parallelism, (b) to the metrical structure, and (c) in all probability to a grammatical idiosyncrasy of the author of the Psalm.

(a) גילו is against the parallelism. Whether it is an interpolation or a corruption is a question that can be left for the present, though at the outset with scholars generally I took it to be an interpolation and so excised it. Turning to נשקו בר it flashed upon me that this phrase was a corruption of הקשיבו. Thus we should have:

Serve the Lord with fear,  
And with trembling hearken.

This emendation satisfies the parallelism save that there is no parallel to 'the Lord.' If the parallel is perfect then, we should expect to find the missing parallel word under the corruption גילו.

(b) At this stage I showed my emendation to

<sup>1</sup> The Syriac alone of the ancient versions renders 'son.'



various scholars, who approved of it provisionally, and finally to Dr. Cowley. Dr. Cowley after some study of the problem made a great improvement on the emended verses by showing that נִלִּי was a corruption of אִלִּי. By this discovery the parallelism is rendered complete and the metrical structure of the verse is recovered, which runs thus :

וְאִלִּי בְרַעְדָּה הַקְשִׁיבִי,

and the couplet is perfect in every respect :

Serve the Lord with fear,  
And unto him with trembling hearken.

Thus the original is recovered by the change of a few letters and without an excision of any kind. But the recovered text has some further support from the fact stated in (c).

(c) The reader will recognize that in the above couplet we find the grammatical and rhetorical figure chiasmus—that is, a figure by which in the case of two parallel clauses the order of the words in the one is inverted in the other. Now, if we examine 2<sup>1. 2. 5</sup>, and especially 2<sup>9. 10</sup>, we shall find that the author of the Psalm has already used this figure five times. That he has again used it here, evidence of an independent character serves to prove.

Thus in the emended line, though no word has been excised, the perfect parallelism in the two clauses has been recovered, as well as the metrical structure. Finally, the emendation thus effected is confirmed by the fact that the very order of the words represents the rhetorical figure chiasmus, of which the author is very fond.

Thus the strophe which refers only to God and His judgment runs :

Now therefore, O ye kings, be wise :  
Be instructed, ye judges of the earth.  
Serve the Lord with fear,  
And unto him with trembling hearken,  
Lest he be angry, and ye perish in the way.  
Blessed are all that put their trust in him.

[I may mention here a few of the most notable emendations of former scholars. For נִקְשָׁה בִּר Lagarde proposes מוֹסְרִי = 'puts on his bonds,' Brüll, בִּקְשָׁה פָּנָי, 'seek his face.' But the metre does not admit of these. Cheyne, followed by Marti and Duhm, regards נִלִּי and נִשְׁקוּ to be two competing readings and both incorrect. Duhm suggests וְשָׁחוּ = 'and bow ye down,' but this is

insufficient for the metre ; Cheyne, וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוִי לוֹ, 'and do homage.']

Ps 119<sup>85</sup>.—

The proud have digged pits for me,  
Which are not after thy law.

So the A.V. The R.V. (so also Kautsch's German Version) runs :

The proud have digged pits for me,  
Who are not after thy law.

Both renderings reproduce the text accurately, but the couplet in either case is unsatisfactory. That 'the proud' or the 'pits' which they dig for the righteous are not according to God's law would be a truism, unworthy of a place even in a Tupper *in duodecimo*.

Briggs draws attention to the fact that, whereas the Massoretic put the negative after the relative (אֲשֶׁר לֹא = 'which are not'), the LXX puts it before it, *i.e.* οὐς ὅς, which presupposes אֲשֶׁר לֹא. The latter he takes to be a corruption of לֹא אֲשֶׁר (= 'for one who'), and translates :

The proud have dug for me pits—  
For one who is according to thy commandments.

But this is not much of an improvement on the R.V. Besides, it does not explain the genesis of the different order in the Massoretic and LXX.

That none of the above renderings or emendations are satisfactory is clear. 'Notwithstanding, the present writer is assured that it is possible to emend the text so as to do justice to the sense and explain the variants.

Now the one fact that emerges from the renderings just given is that there appears to be nothing wrong with the first line of the couplet, nor with the closing words of the second line, 'after thy law.' The corruption, in other words, lies in אֲשֶׁר לֹא (= 'which are not'). If the relative is retained, it must refer to one or other of the three nouns in the first line, as in the three versions just given. The result, as we have already seen, is pure bathos in all three.

Hence we assume that אֲשֶׁר at any rate is corrupt. Now if אֲשֶׁר is corrupt, the text of itself suggests that behind אֲשֶׁר there stood originally אֲשֶׁרִי (*i.e.* אֲשֶׁרִי = 'my footsteps'). This word



occurs frequently in this connexion: cf. Ps 37<sup>81</sup> 17<sup>5, 11</sup> 44<sup>18</sup>, Job 31<sup>7</sup>, Pr 14<sup>15</sup>. Further, this word suits the first line of the couplet perfectly: the pits are digged for the feet of the righteous. It suits also perfectly the words that follow in the second line, 'after thy law'—if we excise the negative. Leaving out the negative we have:

The proud have digged pits for me,  
(But) my footsteps are according to thy law.

Here the meaning is all that could be desired. The Psalmist states that the proud have digged pits into which he may fall, but he fears them not; for his footsteps are directed by the law of his God.

The omission of the adversative particle 'but'

is frequent in Ps 119: see 119<sup>23, 51, 61, 70, 78, 81, 83, 141, 143, 157, 163</sup>.

But how are we to explain the genesis of the negative? This is quite easy. So long as אֲשֶׁר ('my footsteps') stood uncorrupted in the text, there was no ground for the interpolation of the negative. But, when it was corrupted into אֲשֶׁר (= 'which'), a subsequent scribe, taking this naturally to be a relative referring either to 'proud' or 'pits,' added לֹא (= 'not') in the margin. This לֹא was subsequently incorporated into the text: by one scribe *before the relative*—hence the LXX. Vulgate versions: by another scribe *after the relative*—hence the Massoretic text.

Thus the above emendation satisfies every requirement of the text.

## Literature.

### PERSIA.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., has issued his great book, *A History of Persia*, in a second edition, bringing it up to date (Macmillan, 2 vols., 8vo, pp. xxviii, 563; xx, 594; 70s. net). It is six years since the first edition was published, and at that time just a century had elapsed since the publication of Sir John Malcolm's *History of Persia*. In that long period the mystery of the cuneiform inscriptions had been solved, Susa had yielded up its secrets, and in many other directions a notable advance had been effected. Each important discovery had been embodied in some work of special value, but no book had been written dealing with Persia as a whole and embodying the rich fruits of all that modern research. It was time that another History of Persia should be written, and Sir Percy Sykes was the man to write it.

For he had spent twenty-one years in Persia. He was a writer as well as an administrator. He had given himself to the study of the literature of and about Persia and to the study of the country and the people. All that is necessary to the writing of a great history was his, and the History he wrote was undoubtedly great.

But in its new edition it is greater. All the illustrations are in the new edition and there are new maps, magnificent maps. The story of the

War as it affected Persia is told in fullness. A wonderful story it is—quite by itself, not at all like the story of the war in Palestine or Mesopotamia. And there is a long chapter at the end on 'Persia after the Great War.'

The future of the country is not easily foreseen. The danger is from the Bolsheviks. 'Will Persia become a convert to Bolshevik propaganda? It is difficult to answer this question. We read of proposals emanating from Moscow, by the terms of which the Bolsheviks cancel all debts owed by Persia, and all railway, road, and land concessions. Compensation, too, is promised for damage due to the Bolshevik invasion. Other terms are tantamount to a recognition of the Soviet principle in Persia; and unlimited consular representation, or, in other words, unlimited opportunities for propaganda are demanded. The Cossack *coup d'état* announced at the time of going to press has brought in a Cabinet which intends to reject both the British and Bolshevik proposals, and to create a force under foreign officers for the defence of the country after the departure of the British troops. Will this new Cabinet, based on the discredited Cossack Division, be strong enough to defend Persia against the Bolsheviks? I doubt it. In my opinion she may burn her fingers in the hot seething cauldron of Russian Communism and will then bitterly repent. It cannot be too often repeated that the percentage of roughs and robbers



in the country is very high, and that a call to loot may prove irresistible, in which case her experience is likely to be terribly severe. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks, whose aim is India, may try to secure the friendship of Persia, but their subordinates will hardly refrain from looting.'

The remedy is with the aristocracy. 'To me it is clear that, unless the upper classes reform themselves and renounce their present privileges, as was done in another Asiatic country, Japan, there can be no real progress. The Turkish proverb runs, "A fish putrefies from the head," and unless the Persian grandees cease to spoil their own countrymen and to add village to village with the proceeds of spoliation, unless they dismiss their hordes of idle servants and themselves work honestly for Persia, they are doomed, and justly doomed, and their country will be involved with them; for the middle and lower classes are not competent to take the lead and save Persia by themselves. Europe in the Middle Ages was ground down by robber barons as Persia is to-day, and yet surely, though slowly, it progressed towards light and liberty; and why should not Persia do as much? But the time is short.'

### THE ANALYSIS OF MIND.

*The Analysis of Mind* is an ambitious title. It is the title which the Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S., has given to a published volume of lectures which were delivered in London and Peking (Allen & Unwin; 16s. net). It is an ambitious title; and yet it is not ambitious enough. For if Mr. Russell offers an analysis of mind, he also offers an analysis of matter.

There is a movement at present among psychologists, 'especially those of the behaviourist school,' to make psychology dependent on physiology, and to think of matter as much more solid and indubitable than mind. There is also a movement among physicists, 'especially Einstein and other exponents of the theory of relativity,' to make matter less and less material. Mr. Russell writes this book in order to reconcile these two movements. That which seems to him 'to reconcile the materialistic tendency of psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics is the view of William James and the American new realists, according to which the "stuff" of the world is neither mental nor material, but a "neutral stuff," out of which both are constructed.'

It seems simple; it is almost satisfying. We wait only to hear what this 'neutral stuff' is. But we still wait. It is called 'the primal stuff of the universe' and other names, but all its names and titles simply walk round it, like policemen round an enclosed ring: what is inside the ring we never see.

And yet the book is very readable. If we do not reach the end of the journey and find the neutral stuff, we taste and see many interesting things by the way. Mr. Russell's elaborate discussion of belief is one thing. Three elements, he tells us, are involved in believing—namely, the believing, what is believed, and the objective. 'Suppose I believe, for example, "that Cæsar crossed the Rubicon."' The objective of my belief is an event which happened long ago, which I never saw and do not remember. This event itself is not in my mind when I believe that it happened. It is not correct to say that I am believing the actual event; what I am believing is something now in my mind, something related to the event, but obviously not to be confounded with the event, since the event is not occurring now but the believing is. What a man is believing at a given moment is wholly determinate if we know the contents of his mind at that moment; but Cæsar's crossing of the Rubicon was an historical physical event, which is distinct from the present contents of every present mind. What is believed, however true it may be, is not the actual fact that makes the belief true, but a present event related to the fact.'

Does belief always influence action? That is another interesting point. And again Mr. Russell has his apt illustration. 'Suppose I am invited to become King of Georgia: I find the prospect attractive, and go to Cook's to buy a third-class ticket to my new realm. At the last moment I remember Charles I. and all the other monarchs who have come to a bad end; I change my mind, and walk out without completing the transaction. But such incidents are rare, and cannot constitute the whole of my belief that Charles I. was executed. The conclusion seems to be that, although a belief always *may* influence action if it becomes relevant to a practical issue, it often exists actively (not as a mere disposition) without producing any voluntary movement whatever. If this is true, we cannot define belief by the effect on voluntary movements.'



### CHRISTIANITY IN ITS MODERN EXPRESSION.

Notes of lectures are rarely readable. The volume entitled *Christianity in its Modern Expression* (Macmillan; \$3.75) contains the Notes dictated to his students by the Rev. George Burman Foster, late Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Chicago, and edited by Professor D. C. Macintosh of Yale. And it would have been no more readable than any volume containing any other professor's dictated Notes, if the Notes had been published alone. What makes this book interesting and indeed very valuable is the fact that Professor Foster was in the habit of arresting the dictation and uttering 'elaborations and extemporaneous remarks.' These remarks, says the editor, contain 'many brilliant and memorable sayings of this inspiring and thought-provoking teacher.' He says truly. Now these remarks were also 'taken down' by his pupils, and they are reproduced verbatim. The Notes are for the student, and they are worth studying. The remarks are for us all.

Take one of the remarks: 'In substituting Jesus' person for his cause [the gospel about Jesus for the gospel of Jesus], has Christianity gone astray from its birth? The essential thing in the Christian faith in Jesus is that God is as good as Jesus is, even though appearances may sometimes be to the contrary. If we can stick to this in all the grind and torture and darkness of this world, we can live in hope and die without despair. If the will at the heart of things is, in its attitude toward us, as good as the will of Jesus, I can bury my child, I can pass through invalidism, lose my fortune, be maligned, and die forgotten before I die; I can assume too that the divine attitude toward me in my guilt will be one of mercy. If God is truly represented by the will of Jesus, made omnipotent, what need I fear? If we depart from this, we depart from the Christian religion. As people decline to believe this, they decline, theoretically and practically, from Christianity.'

A quotable note is not so easily found. This will serve: 'Christianity, in distinction from the rigidity of law religions and from the unhistoricalness of the other redemption religions, is a religion of the spirit, which, along with the permanent features it contains, enters into living history, i.e.

it itself enters into a process of development. Precisely in this capacity for development by which Christianity is distinguished from other religions do we find the basis (a) for its missionary claims more consciously and more consistently than can be made by any other religion, and (b) for its claim to be the ultimate religion, and to proclaim *universally valid*, permanent truth.'

### DAY-DREAMS.

'During the war I wanted the name of a German paidological review, which I knew very well, for it had inserted an essay of mine. As one commonly does, I tried to create a mental atmosphere calculated to favour the coming to the surface of the stubborn title: I tried to call up a visual image of it; in my mind I went over its dimensions, the colour of the cover, the special character of the print, the place of publication, the room of the Sociological Institute where I used to read it, the table upon which it was laid, the persons with whom I used to discuss it, etc., all without avail. Then I thought: If I could see one of the other German reviews I used to read before the war, I should remember it at once. Thereby I felt a certain impression which I will call intuition, but which is in fact indescribable, for the reason stated before; it gave me the certainty that this would suffice to evoke the stubborn recollection. (I did not know yet, at that time, as I do now, the importance of the affects in recollection.) A few weeks later, when on leave in London, I went to the British Museum to look up the name I wanted, for I hoped I should recognize it in the catalogue of reviews. Scarcely had I opened the catalogue when the title I wanted so badly—*Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung*—came to the fore spontaneously, before any search, to my great and agreeable surprise. I cannot help thinking that the entrance to the reading-room evoked the mood in which I used to enter the similar room of the Sociological Institute in Brussels that was so familiar to me, and that this affect was responsible for the re-appearance of the link that I wanted, and was missing when I had tried before to revive the associations connected with the place where I prepared most of my research work.'

This power is called 'the power of the affect.' You will find its place and importance in Psychology if you read *The Psychology of Day-dreams*,



by Dr. J. Varendonck, formerly Lecturer in the Paidological Faculty of Brussels. The book is published in English by Messrs. Allen & Unwin, with an Introduction by Dr. S. Freud (18s. net).

Dr. Freud does not *wholly* approve of it. He dislikes some of its terminology. The author, he says, 'includes the sort of thought-activity which he has observed in Bleuler's autistic thinking, but calls it, as a rule, *fore-conscious thinking*, according to the custom prevailing in psycho-analysis. However, the autistic thinking of Bleuler does not by any means correspond with the extension and the contents of the fore-conscious, neither can I admit that the name used by Bleuler has been happily chosen. The designation "fore-conscious" thinking itself as a characteristic appears to me misleading and unsatisfactory.' At the same time, however, he heartily approves of the publication and translation of the book. For it 'contains a significant novelty, and will justly arouse the interest of all philosophers, psychologists and psycho-analysts. After an effort lasting for some years the author has succeeded in getting hold of the mode of thought-activity to which one abandons oneself during the state of distraction into which we readily pass before sleep or upon incomplete awakening. He has brought to the consciousness the chains of thought originating in these conditions without the interference of the will; he has written them down, studied their peculiarities and differences with directed conscious thinking, and has made thereby a series of important discoveries which lead to still vaster problems and give rise to the formulation of still more far-reaching questions. Many a point in the psychology of the dream and the defective act finds, thanks to the observations of Dr. Varendonck, a trustworthy settlement.'

### ISLAMIC MYSTICISM.

A volume of *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* has been issued from the Cambridge University Press (24s. net). The author is Reynold Alleyne Nicholson, Litt.D., LL.D., Lecturer in Persian in the University of Cambridge, and formerly Fellow of Trinity College. There is no study which is more free from sectarianism than the study of Mysticism. It is the one touch of nature which makes the whole world kin. For the whole world comes from God and goes to God, and the desire after God has ever been the most nearly universal

of all the desires of the human heart. Among the mystics of Islam, as translated and interpreted by Dr. Nicholson, we are at home, with scarce a feeling of strangeness. We are almost as much at home with Abu Sa'îd and Ibnu 'l-Farid as if we sat down with Thomas Law or Alexander Whyte. And when the mystic is a poet the common inheritance is yet more evident. We take Wordsworth's 'Heaven lies about us in our infancy' to our heart at once. But, long before Wordsworth, Ibnu 'l-Arabi had said:

'The child affects the father's disposition, so that he descends from his authority and plays with him and prattles to him and brings his mind down to the child's, for unconsciously he is under his sway; then he becomes engrossed with educating and protecting his child and with seeking what is good for him and amusing him, that he may not be unhappy. All this is the work of the child upon the father and is owing to the power of his state, for the child was with God a short while ago (*ḥadithu* 'ahd<sup>in</sup> bi-rabbihi) since he is newly come into the world, whereas the father is further away; and one that is further from God is subject to one that is nearer to Him.'

How will it be possible to convey a notion of the wealth of welcome material on the mystic state which this book contains? Try the thought of the Perfect Man. 'What,' says Dr. Nicholson, 'do Šūfis mean when they speak of the Perfect Man (*al-insānu 'l-kāmil*), a phrase which seems first to have been used by the celebrated Ibnu 'l-'Arabī, although the notion underlying it is almost as old as Šūfism itself? The question might be answered in different ways, but if we seek a general definition, perhaps we may describe the Perfect Man as a man who has fully realised his essential oneness with the Divine Being in whose likeness he is made. This experience, enjoyed by prophets and saints and shadowed forth in symbols to others, is the foundation of the Šūfī theosophy. Therefore, the class of Perfect Men comprises not only the prophets from Adam to Mohammed, but also the superlatively elect (*khushūsu 'l-khushūsu*) amongst the Šūfis, i.e. the persons named collectively *awliyā*, plural of *walī*, a word originally meaning "near," which is used for "friend," "protégé," or "devotee." Since the *walī* or saint is the popular type of Perfect Man, it should be understood that the essence of Mohammedan saintship, as of prophecy, is nothing less than Divine illumination, immediate



vision and knowledge of things unseen and unknown, when the veil of sense is suddenly lifted and the conscious self passes away in the overwhelming glory of "the One true Light." An ecstatic feeling of oneness with God constitutes the *wali*. It is the end of the Path (*ṭariqa*), in so far as the discipline of the Path is meant to pre-dispose and prepare the disciple to receive this incalculable gift of Divine grace, which is not gained or lost by anything that a man may do, but comes to him in proportion to the measure and degree of spiritual capacity with which he was created.'

### THE MIDDLE AGES.

In the autumn term of 1920 a series of lectures were delivered at King's College, London, on *Mediæval Contributions to Modern Civilisation*. They have now been issued as a volume—a handsome volume—edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Mediæval History in the University of London, with a preface by Mr. Ernest Barker, M.A., Principal of King's College (Harrap; 10s. 6d. net).

In the Preface Mr. Barker says: 'The mediæval contributions to modern civilisation, which are the theme of this book, are twofold. There is the contribution of the idealised Middle Ages, magnified, mirrored, and roseate in the reflective thought of modern man concerning the Middle Ages. This is their contribution as it appeared to Morris, or as it appears to Mr. Belloc, or Mr. Chesterton, or the votaries of guild socialism. It is a contribution made not by the actual Middle Ages, but by a projection of the Middle Ages on an ideal screen by an idealising mind. It *is* a contribution, but it is an indirect contribution; it moves the mind and stirs the spirit of men, but the motion and the stirring are those not of the Middle Ages themselves, but rather of a certain antiquarian idealism—an inverted Utopianism, as it were, leading men to find the Utopia, or Nowhere, of the future in what one may call a Never Was of the past. But besides this indirect and ideal contribution—none the less real because it is indirect and ideal—there is the direct and actual contribution of the Middle Ages as they actually were. It is this contribution which is the peculiar theme of this book.'

The words 'Middle Ages' are used with generosity. 'It is the millennium from the fifth to the

fifteenth century; from the fall of the Roman Empire in the West to the fall of the Roman Empire in the East; from the triumph of Christianity over classical paganism to the revolt of Protestantism against Catholic Christianity. It is the thousand years which saw the rise, the mighty reign, and the decline of the papal monarchy; which witnessed the dominance of Feudalism and chivalry, whereby the cosmopolitan commonwealth of later Rome was transmuted into the new integration of the modern state-system; which beheld, and indeed achieved, the education and evangelisation of the barbarians whose ignorant and demoniac hordes at first overwhelmed both Latin culture and the Catholic faith; which, finally, effected the fusion of Roman and Teuton into a single homogeneous society.'

So Professor Hearnshaw interprets the title in his introductory lecture. Then each lecturer gives himself to his own subject within those generous limits, Professor Jenkins to the Religious Contribution; Professor Wildon Carr to Philosophy; Dr. Singer to Science; Dr. Percy Dearmer to Art; Sir Israel Gollancz to Poetry; Professor Adamson to Education; Miss Hilda Johnstone to Society; Mr. Adair to Economics; Professor Allen to Politics.

In the very first lecture the lecturer finds himself forced to account for Christianity—'the triumph of the communion of saints over the might and majesty of imperial Rome.' Now Professor Hearnshaw is an historian. Already an historian named Gibbon accounted for it. Does Dr. Hearnshaw follow Gibbon? 'The full explanation of the miracle [note that word] lies, perhaps, in realms beyond the sphere of the historian. Yet even he on his low plane of mundane sequences can see four facts which go far to solve the mystery. First, Christianity was, as a faith, incomparably superior to its rivals, whether they were the old theologies of Rome or the newer and more popular Oriental cults; it satisfied the religious sense as none of them did, with its revelation of an incarnation, its proclamation of an atonement, its offer of redemption, and its promise of eternal life. Secondly, it provided a more rational explanation of man and the universe than did any of the current philosophies, rendering more intelligible the mystery of existence, sundering the veil of scepticism and despair. Thirdly, it set before the eyes of a world satiated with bestiality and blood a new and lofty

ethical ideal: the old gods were non-moral; the cults were often frankly immoral; Christianity came to raise a standard of exalted purity, it showed the ideal already realised in the life of the Perfect Man, and it possessed a power which enabled it to cleanse and transform the debasement of the vilest mortal into the same immaculate sanctity. Finally, the Church had in its organisation—its bishops and presbyters, its synods and councils, its missionaries and evangelists, its monks and anchorites—a social structure of such immense stability and strength that it was able to withstand the most violent shocks of all its foes.'

### HENRY JAMES PIGGOTT.

Two ministers from this country spent their lives in Rome as preachers of the gospel and had their greatness acknowledged—Dr. Gordon Gray, the Presbyterian, and the Rev. Henry James Piggott, B.A., the Wesleyan. The biography of Dr. Gordon Gray has still to come. That of Mr. Piggott has been written by his son, the Rev. T. C. Piggott, assisted by the Rev. T. Durley. *Life and Letters of Henry James Piggott, B.A.*, is the title (Epworth Press; 7s. 6d. net).

Mr. Piggott's life was one of extraordinary strenuousness. But hard work did not kill him. He was born in 1831 and in 1915 he was still presiding over the Commission which revised Diodati's Italian version of the Bible. 'We are spending now about £5000 a year. We have ten evangelists; seven schools, with their complement of teachers; five colporteurs; fourteen or fifteen rented apartments, halls, or churches; a shop and dépôt for bibles and religious books. For all this complicated and varied expenditure, I alone am responsible: in most cases what I do not personally see to is badly done.' That was in 1863, and that or something like it went on to the end.

His greatest gift was discernment of character. And he needed to keep it fresh and fit. For every now and then came priests, and what were they in heart and life? They were not all bad, of course. There was Sciarelli for one—'Francesco Sciarelli, a young Franciscan monk who came from Chieti in the Abruzzi. He had served in the company of volunteer ecclesiastics who had followed Garibaldi in the Neapolitan campaign; but had returned to his convent. His brief respiration of the air of freedom and light that had come to him

from the Word of God and from contact with a neighbouring Protestant minister, had made the old life intolerable. From an appeal to me at Milan resulted a correspondence which revealed a man of no ordinary gifts and culture; and a soul as sincere now in its desire of consecration to the better understood gospel of Christ, as it had been in its former consecration to the ascetic life of the monk. After a few months' instruction in Milan, and a brief period of preliminary service at Parma, Francesco Sciarelli joined Mr. Jones at Naples, and to his zeal and activity was largely due the very successful initiation of the mission in that city, in Via Toledo.'

It was a life of adventure—adventure in the things of the soul most of all. And the surprises were not all on Mr. Piggott's side. 'Mary [his daughter] called on her friend the other day. Somehow it came up that we had evening prayer in the family; she became very curious; whatever did I pray about? Mary explained: of course there was adoration, there was thanksgiving, there was confession of sins, etc. etc. Angelina was especially amazed about the last point, and soon afterwards, her husband and sister coming in, she could not contain herself, but exclaimed to them: "What do you think Miss Piggott has been telling me? They have prayers every evening, Mr. Piggott prays, and would you believe it—he confesses his sins before his daughter and the servant!!!"'

*The Children's Story Garden* (Lippincott; 6s. net) is a collection of Quaker tales for children. They have a moral every one, but it is well sugared. For every story is a story and told with skill.

Dr. W. Douglas Mackenzie, President of Hartford Theological Seminary, wrote his father's Life, and the book was a revelation of how a man may be both missionary and statesman, and the better statesman because he is a missionary. That memoir is now out of print, and Dr. Mackenzie has written a smaller book to take its place. The title is simply *John Mackenzie* (London Missionary Society; 1s. net).

Give a good start to *Man in India* (Luzac; 5s.). It is a quarterly record of Anthropological Science with special reference to India. The editor is Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Roy, M.A.,



B.L., M.L.C. The first number (March 1921) has contributions by Dr. W. Crooke and Dr. W. H. R. Rivers—enough to float any anthropological magazine.

The journalist is probably maligned but he is certainly credited with less knowledge of the Bible than any other person. Mr. P. Whitwell Wilson is a journalist and knows the Bible. His knowledge of it is a layman's knowledge. That is to say, he was not trained to study the Bible beginning with its language and going on to its theology. He began reading it for the interest, the human interest, he found in it. And he persisted in his reading till at last he was able to write a book which he called *The Christ We Forget*; then another book which he called *The Church We Forget*; and both these books were worth reading and were widely read. Now he has written a third book, which he calls *The Vision We Forget* (Morgan & Scott; 7s. 6d. net). And although it will not be so widely read as the other two, for it is an exposition of the Apocalypse, to those who do read it the enjoyment will be very great.

Mr. Wilson did not study Dr. Charles before he wrote his book on the Apocalypse. It would have made no difference to him if had done so. Dr. Charles is not in all his thoughts. He finds his own meanings in the visions of the Apocalypse; he finds his own author of the book; he finds his own Christ from beginning to end of it. And always what he finds is worth reading.

For it has to do with to-day. 'This, indeed, is what first startled and then amazed me. What would you say yourself if you were handed one day a document, undoubtedly written about two thousand years ago, in which you were not expecting to discover anything about the happenings of last week, and on reading it, as you would read, for instance, Homer, were suddenly to find in it curious yet exact descriptions of modern war, of recent revolutions, of the electric telegraph, of the women's movement, of the popular press, of the distributed Bible, pocket size, of Capital and Labour, of Catholics and Protestants, of scientific research, of the art of healing, of international peace,—in fact, of all that is characteristic, whether good or ill, in the Twentieth Century? Suppose that you also found aeroplanes described, with a quite irresistible and hitherto incomprehensible accuracy, so that until aeroplanes were invented,

nobody could imagine what the passage meant, while after they were invented, nobody could doubt that only aeroplanes were referred to—what then would you say? If you are a scientist, claiming to face phenomena fairly and squarely, why do you turn shy at this phenomenon? Do you think that the phenomenon will disappear, merely because you are trying to ignore it? It is only the fool who says in his heart that there is no God.'

Mr. Dudley Wright is a student of the Occult. He writes on vampires, and other terrors of the day and night. He also writes on *Masonic Legends and Traditions* (Rider; 5s. net). That is his latest book, and his weirdest. For it mixes up fact and fancy beyond belief. Not that Mr. Wright is the author of the mixture. He is a most faithful historian. It is the human mind that has done the mingling, and a disturbing commentary on the human mind is furnished by it. Of edification, of help for right thinking or right living, there is not a particle. Nay, if any purpose can be discovered at all, it is the desire to escape from the responsibilities of thinking and of living. And sometimes it is sheer folly: 'One of the questions which the Queen of Sheba is said to have asked was how to pass a silk thread through a bead, the perforation of which was not straight through, but winding like the body of a moving serpent. It was performed, at the King's request, by a small white maggot, which, taking the end of the thread between its teeth, crawled in at one end and out at the other. As a reward, the King granted the request of the insect that it might lodge inside the seed vessels and other parts of plants and feed thereon.'

*The Starvelings* (Society of SS. Peter and Paul; 3s. 6d.) are the clergy of the Church of England. The Rev. F. J. Hammond, Vicar of All Hallows, Hoo, Kent, has a remedy for their distress. Relieve them of the burden of maintaining great vicarages with gardens, greenhouses, and glebes. Sell it all and distribute the money: there would be enough to go round.

Mr. Gustav Spiller is an advocate, an earnest, persevering, self-denying advocate, of moral education. Unfortunately he is also an opponent of religious education—as earnest, persevering, and self-denying. This need not, and probably does

not, prevent religious people, who are as anxious for a better moral standard of life in the rising generation as he is, from co-operating with him; but it seriously restricts his own influence for good.

And he seems to find it so. In his new book he is puzzled to discover a way of working which shall be effective in moral results among the young. 'Various items occurred to him [he speaks of himself in the third person], but, from his methodological standpoint, nothing worthy of being advocated as a system. For some ten years he recurred repeatedly to his favourite theme of conceiving an adequate plan, but in vain. During the last two years, however, he felt that just as his young children learnt to play on the piano, so should they become proficient in matters of right conduct; but still no luminous inspiration came to indicate how this was to be accomplished. One day, at last, whilst one of his children was playing the piano, a feasible solution dawned on him. It was to the effect that, accepting as a basis the golden rule enunciated in § 97, one might begin with posture training—sitting, standing, walking, etc., proceed to handshaking and simple salutation, then to simple conversation, and so forth. The general methods employed would be those in common use for all arts.'

The golden rule enunciated in § 97 is this: 'Enlightened men and women will necessarily manifest in all relationships of life a profound fellow-feeling and self-reverence, guided by fullest information and circumspect reasoning, accompanied by geniality and tact, and intelligently realised by a strenuous and firm-bent will which is inspired by the desire to serve the good of humanity.'

The whole thought is far removed from the method of Christ—nearly as far as it could be. But for the very purpose of seeing how futile the advice to do better is, hanging thus in the air, the book is of inestimable value. Never before and nowhere else has it been proved more conclusively that he that findeth his life shall lose it. The whole book of which the title is *A New System of Scientific Procedure* (Watts) is a commendation, while meant to be a contradiction, of that profound saying of Jesus Christ.

The eyes of all the world are on the lands of the Bible. What are we going to do with Palestine?

What are we going to make of Mesopotamia? But first, all the world should know how it is with these countries now. A book on *The Geography of Bible Lands* has been prepared by Rena L. Crosby and published at the Abingdon Press in New York and Cincinnati (\$1.75). The text is in short paragraphs, accurate and clear. The book is well furnished with maps and illustrations. At the end of every 'Lesson' there are questions for self-examination or further search.

Bishop William A. Quayle, of the Methodist Episcopal Church of America, is a lover of books, of books as books. He loves to have them and to handle them, whether he reads them or not. And he loves to talk about them. You hear him talking about his books in *Books as a Delight* (Abingdon Press; 35 cents net).

Arthur George Heath, sometime Fellow of New College, Oxford, was one of those whom monstrous war devoured. He left little of output behind him. But one good thing he left—the essay which was awarded the Green Moral Philosophy Prize in 1914. And his friends, Reginald Lennard and John D. G. Medley, have published it. The title is *The Moral and Social Significance of the Conception of Personality* (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press; 7s. 6d. net).

What is the purpose of the essay? It is, says the author of it, 'to discuss those aspects of personality which have most direct bearing on the theory of conduct, with reference to metaphysics only so far as ethical or political problems turn out to demand it.' But what is personality? Again he tells us: 'Not merely to be a self, but to have a developed consciousness of self: to realize definitely the existence of an outer world against which the self acts and reacts: to form deliberate plans in which memory serves to guide, and rational criticism to control the will.'

And then, as the essay proceeds, we find that the author's chief desire is first to do away with the notion that God cannot be a person because personality is limited and God must be absolute. Next he seeks to dispose of Lotze's argument that perfection of personality is only attributable to God, the only infinite Person. Then he passes into practical affairs and shows how necessary it is for us to understand what is meant by the personality of corporations and companies and all other



groups or associations that are supposed to have no soul, and act up to the supposition.

*The Quakers: Their Story and Message*, by A. Neave Brayshaw, B.A., LL.B. (Harrogate: Davis). This book, together with J. W. Graham's *The Faith of a Quaker*, will satisfy any reasonable desire to know what Quakerism is and how it has come to be what it is. There are Quakers, it is true, who do not accept Mr. Graham as an exponent of their faith, counting him too 'liberal,' but Mr. Brayshaw is not one of them. On the contrary, he specially commends the book to our notice. He himself, however, writes more lucidly than Mr. Graham, perhaps also more authoritatively. Every conclusion, almost every opinion, is supported by quotation, and the quotations are carefully chosen. Clearly Mr. Brayshaw is thoroughly furnished in the literature of his religion.

Do not miss a single volume of the Swarthmore Lectures. They are of course Quaker lectures and they are often quite Quakerish. But when most occupied with the Quakers they are most instructive—so near the mind of Christ is that Faith at its finest. The Swarthmore Lecture for 1921 was delivered by T. Edmund Harvey, B.A. Its topic is Human Progress. The title given to it when published is *The Long Pilgrimage* (Harro-

gate: Davis; 1s. 6d. net). The question is whether the civilization reached to-day is likely to be maintained or to go down into chaos again. Mr. Harvey believes that it will be maintained if—but all depends on the if—if Christ becomes the centre of unity for modern society. 'The failure of organised Christianity to prevent the world war and its helplessness in face of that vast physical and moral cataclysm does not stand alone. The newer forces of organised socialism and organised labour also aimed to work for a world brotherhood, transcending national differences, and they broke down completely in the same crisis. The differences separating socialists from each other are perhaps even greater and more bitter to-day than those which separate sect from sect and church from church. The acceptance of a mere theory of life, whether it be theological or political, cannot, it is clear, form a basis of union strong enough to stand the strain of such a time as this. A unity must be sought which is deeper than can be given by mere membership in an organisation professing a common doctrine, whether it be economic or religious: it must be found in the very well-springs of will and aspiration, in our attitude to life, in our way of life itself. In the great Christian society this unity is found in loyalty to Jesus Christ Himself as our Master and Guide.'

## Our Lord's Agony in the Garden.

BY WILLIAM E. WILSON, B.D., WOODBROOKE, BIRMINGHAM.

THE late Professor Denney, in discussing our Lord's prayer in Gethsemane, says: 'The divine necessity to lay down His life for men, which we have been led to regard as a fixed point in His mind, did not preclude such conflicts as are described in the last pages of the Gospel; rather was it the condition of our Lord's victory in them.' He then goes on to suggest that though at a distance our Lord could view with something like equanimity His approaching death, as it came close and the full reality of 'treachery, desertion, hate, mockery, injustice, anguish, shame' was vividly before Him, 'It is not hard to conceive that in these circumstances Jesus should have prayed as He did in the

Garden: "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," even though the unmoved conviction of His soul was that He had come to give His life a ransom for many. It is one thing to have the consciousness of so high a calling, another to maintain and give effect to it under conditions from which all that is ideal and divine seems to have withdrawn.'<sup>1</sup>

What Dr. Denney says would no doubt be true of any other than our Lord, for not only would such a one have dreaded the ordeal, but also he would always have been in some doubt as to whether that ordeal was the Father's will for him.

<sup>1</sup> *The Death of Christ* (Revised Ed.), pp. 44, 45.

But according to Dr. Denney's conviction, strongly expressed in the previous chapter in commenting on the words 'The Son of Man must suffer,' there was no doubt whatever in our Lord's mind on this matter. To him it was God's will. 'The divine necessity for a career of suffering and death is primary.' It 'was not simply the moral solution for the situation in which he had found Himself.'<sup>1</sup> That is, the necessity was of the absolute order, definitely preordained by God, and was recognized by Jesus as such. Upon such a hypothesis, great agony and dread on the part of Jesus as the hour approached are natural. Prayer that the Divine strength might uphold Him through it would also be natural. But can we so easily accept the prayer that the cup might be removed? If Dr. Denney's presupposition, that the suffering and death were predetermined by God, and that Jesus knew they were predetermined, is true; and at the same time the common Christian presupposition, that Jesus maintained throughout perfect unity with the will of God, is a fact, it does not seem possible to accept the statement of the Synoptic Gospels that He prayed that He might not have to go through the ordeal. But the episode is mentioned in all three Gospels. Moreover, it was more than a momentary prayer. Matthew and Mark relate that He prayed the prayer twice, and Luke's statement points to prolonged prayer. It is not therefore possible to find a way out of the difficulty (though it would be an unsatisfactory way) by suggesting that the prayer was the sign of a temptation, which was at once overcome. Nor can we reject this part of the narrative on critical grounds. No early Christian would have been likely to invent such a scene. The tendency was rather to eliminate all that seemed to show weakness in Jesus. We may rely upon the Synoptists here. Jesus really prayed these words.

What, then, is the way out? We cannot with good reason reject the statement of the Gospels. We cannot, as Christians, accept the suggestion that Jesus Christ was for a while out of unity with the Divine will. There remains only the possibility that He had not that absolute certainty of His coming death which dogmatic tradition has ascribed to Him. In short, we must conclude that Dr. Denney is going beyond his evidence in maintaining that our Lord's words, 'the Son of Man must suffer,' denote an inward necessity which was

more than 'the moral solution which He had discovered for the fatal situation in which He found Himself.' There are degrees of necessity which are all naturally and correctly expressed by 'must.' The Moslem, believing that his smallest acts are preordained from eternity, says 'I must,' and regards himself as the passive victim of a sort of divine coercion; but to most men who say 'I must,' the very most that it means is that an inward necessity compels them to take a certain line of action, because their own conception of duty, arrived at through a review of circumstances, points to that way as right. But when the 'must' is of this sort, an alteration in circumstances may remove the necessity. What seemed at a distance as though it would be a duty, is, as events fall out, no longer required of us. If the necessity which Jesus felt for His death was of this latter sort, His prayer in the Garden was natural and right. If He had seen, as seems probable from the Gospel narrative, that the influential people of Judaism would neither accept Him nor His message, but on the contrary were becoming more and more determinedly opposed to Him; and at the same time had realized, helped to that realization by meditating on the Suffering Servant of Is 53, that His death would bring to God men whom His life had failed to reach, is it not natural that He would have begun to teach His disciples that 'The Son of Man must suffer'? We can, I think, imagine Him intellectually convinced that His work could not be accomplished apart from His death, and therefore that His death was a part of His divine vocation, and yet hoping against hope that His own people might yet recognize and accept Him.

Under these circumstances the prayer in the Garden is seen to have a meaning different from that which has been usually assigned to it. The older dogmatic interpreted it as the outcome of our Lord's terror in contemplation of Divine desertion, and of suffering vicariously the torments of the damned. Such an anticipation was enough to cause agony to any one. But amongst present-day theologians it is no longer believed that He either suffered the torments of the damned or was actually deserted by God, and the tendency is to suggest that the whole scene was simply due to the inevitable shrinking from suffering of an exceptionally sensitive soul. This, in face of the fact that many naturally shrinking and sensitive

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 22.



souls have gone to death for Him with the greatest fortitude, seems inadequate. It ascribes to Jesus weakness, from which many of His followers have been free. If, on the other hand, it be held that while intellectually He was convinced that His people had rejected Him, yet still conviction alternated with a hope that even at the last they might repent and accept Him,<sup>1</sup> His agony need no longer be explained as shrinking from His own suffering, but as shrinking from the realization that so far His mission had not been accepted, and all that that fact entailed in tragedy for the Jewish race. Thus the intensity of His agony in the Garden may well be a measure of the intensity of His yearning love for His people. It is unselfish through and through. It would then appear that this explanation of our Lord's Agony in the Garden is closely akin to the explanation of His Cry on the Cross, which, in collaboration with Mr. J. A. Smallbone, I suggested in *THE EXPOSITORY TIMES* (August 1920).

There are three passages at least in the Synoptic Gospels which lend confirmation both to my suggestion that the necessity which our Lord saw for His death was not absolute (at any rate to Him), and to the view that the agony in the Garden was due to the intensity of His yearning over the Jewish people rather than to anticipation of His coming suffering. They are the two laments over Jerusalem and the parable of the Vineyard. One lament, 'O Jerusalem, Jerusalem,' occurs in both Matthew and Luke (Mt 23<sup>37</sup>, Lk 13<sup>34</sup>). It combines a full recognition of the guilt of the Jewish people ('which killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee') with the tenderest solicitude (the hen and chickens figure); and then goes on to forebode only disaster as the result of the rejection of Him. Yet it concludes with the expectation that Jerusalem may even now turn and welcome Him as the Messiah. When it was said, we can see that the possibility, or perhaps probability, of His rejection was already struggling in Him with the hope that the Jewish people would repent and accept Him. The second lament (Lk 19<sup>41</sup>) 'If thou hadst known!' has the same note of yearning love, the same suggestion that repentance would have brought national salvation, but instead of con-

cluding on a note of hope, there is only certainty of impending calamity. The last words are, 'because thou knewest not the day of thy visitation,' as though He were saying, 'In rejecting me you brought inevitable doom on yourself, because you thereby took the way of death instead of the way of Life.' Thus both laments suggest that Israel might have believed (in which case it would not have been the Jews that compassed His death), and that the disappointment and sorrow of our Lord that they did not believe was so intense that He could scarcely bring Himself to accept it as a fact.

The thought expressed by the parable of the Vineyard is similar. The Jewish nation does not bear fruit. (Surely here the sharing of their heritage of true religion with the Gentiles is the fruit.) Servant after servant is sent to them and rejected. Last the Son is sent, with the words, 'They will reverence my son.' Does not this mean that it had not been a foregone conclusion in our Lord's own mind that He would be rejected? And the rejection and death of the Son are represented as the wicked acts of depraved men, not as predetermined by God. The story itself seems to have been told as one of a number of last appeals to the Jewish rulers. If such appeals had been successful, the death of Christ would not have occurred, or at all events would not have occurred then, or at the instigation of His fellow-countrymen.

The direction in which these considerations point is plain. It is that there seems to be a great deal in the references of our Lord to His death which has been mistakenly interpreted as meaning that His death had a Godward reference. These passages suggest that He foresaw it, not as the inevitable outcome of Divine preordination, but as the result that would certainly come if the Jewish nation did not repent. Yet this does not mean that His death was not *in the circumstances* the Will of God for Him. It rather means that the appeal of love which had characterized His whole life and teaching found its consummation in His death. God's message had to be given so as to be clear to men. Had they been less blinded by prejudice and false principle, it may be that they would have accepted it on the word of Jesus. As it is, it is His death that has been the convincing proof of His love and of the love of the God He represented.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the words 'With God all things are possible,' used with regard to the conversion of unlikely people (Mk 10<sup>27</sup>).

## In the Study.

### *Virginibus Puerisque.*

#### Windows.

'I am the light of the world.'—Jn 8<sup>12</sup>.

I WANT to speak to you about windows, because they play such a big part in our lives.

There are, as you know, front windows, back windows, and 'skylights,' and each of these gives us a different outlook. In the country front and back windows are pretty much alike; but in towns or villages to have a front window means seeing life. There are the passers-by, shops, school-children, message boys, carts—why, you could all write down long lists of things that are to be seen from a front window. And there may be a garden in front of your house; what would life be without gardens?

To have a back window and no other may mean a very dull life, especially if one is kept indoors by work that is monotonous. There was an old woman—a dear, honest soul—who eked out a living by doing odd jobs for her neighbours. She wove carpets, sewed bed-quilts, made rugs, or mended house-linen. One evening she brought home two bags full of calico patches which two neighbours had given her with orders to stitch them into quilts. She was delighted at getting the work; but it had always been a great cross to her that the window at which she constantly sat sewing was a back one; for she liked to see everything that was going on outside. 'It's a great divarsion,' she used to say—'a very great divarsion to see Mr. Peters' cows goin' in and out of the byre, day after day; an' that's about all I do see—never git a sight of the folks goin' to meetin' or nothin'. When the minister's prayin' for the widders an' orphans, he'd better make mention of one more,' she once said to a neighbour, 'an' that's women without front windows.' How eagerly she seized upon the few objects of interest that could be seen in the course of the day! Some school-children made a short cut through her yard; she watched for them every day; if they did not appear at the usual time she eyed the clock and muttered, 'I wonder where they can be?' When at last they came, and passed out of sight again, she would think of them for an hour afterwards. Not even

a bird escaped her notice. She paused as she stitched away at a quilt to gaze at one on a young tree opposite. 'That's the same yaller bird I saw yesterday, I believe,' she said; 'I reckon he's goin' to build a nest in that elm.' There was one spot where the grass grew much greener than elsewhere. 'I can't make that out,' she said another day, 'whether that spot is greener than the rest because the sun shines brightly there, or because something's buried there.'

It was thinking about a lonely little girl that brought skylights to my mind. She had no sisters, and her mother had set her love upon her four boys; poor wee Jessie had little attention paid to her. But she had a bedroom with a 'skylight' in it, and when she felt unhappy she used to go and put her head out at it. Then she could see beyond her native town, and she thought of many things. She knew very little poetry; Tennyson's 'May Queen' was about the only poem she could repeat. But there were, of course, hymns she had learnt, and which she could sing in her own way. If you had been in the house with me one night you would have heard Jessie's voice in a hymn nearly every one knows. 'Glory, glory dwelleth in Imanuel's land' were the words that reached me. 'You were making plenty of noise, Jessie,' her mother said when she came downstairs. 'I never thought you would hear me,' she answered; 'my head was out at the skylight.'

Once I happened to be in a Quakers' meeting. It was held in a very plain and simple room. The walls were not painted; they were whitewashed. The forms on which the worshippers sat were plain and uncushioned, and the windows were high up—as far as looking out was concerned they were more impossible than a skylight. There was no stained glass. But when a shaft of pure sunlight struck across the room, it made one think of the 'Better World' of which you children sing. There was no preaching; the worshippers just sat quite silent and waited. It might have been for half an hour or longer. The silence was very impressive, for they were waiting for a message from God. There was a 'skylight' in that Quakers' meeting-house.

Beginning life as you boys and girls are doing is like setting about to build a house. It is right



—it is necessary—that you should have front windows in it; God means you to take your place in the world. Back windows mean the grey days of hard work we have to put in all by ourselves. You must have both. And skylights! Life would be poor indeed without the light that comes down from heaven. If you have your skylights and keep them open it will be but the beginning of life everlasting, for the light that comes down from heaven comes from God Himself.

Is the light for ever failing?

God's in His heaven!

Is the faint heart ever quailing?

God's in His heaven!

God's strong arms are all around you,

In the dark he sought and found you.

All's well! All's well!

All's . . . well!

#### A Bit of Soap.

'Fullers' soap.'—Mal 3<sup>2</sup>.

Our text to-day is one you all know. You made acquaintance with it when you were a very tiny baby and you have met it every day since. But although a bit of soap is such an old friend some of us are not so very fond of it. When we were quite small Nurse or Mother sometimes let it get into our eyes and mouth, and when we grew a bit older we often thought it would be so much nicer to stay grubby than to have to bother washing.

Once a Sunday-school teacher was speaking to some very small boys and girls about the advantages of cleanliness. She was just a little too old to remember what it felt like to be nice and dirty, so she remarked, 'We all like to have clean hands.' But she got no further, for at this point a little voice piped indignantly, 'Well, my big brother doesn't.'

I think that teacher must have been some relation of the lady of whom I once read. One winter morning she was trying to induce her little niece to rise and endure her usual tepid bath. She described in glowing terms the pleasures and privileges of cleanliness; and at last the little maiden remarked cheerfully, 'All right, Auntie, you do as you like; and I'll do as I like. You like to be clean and cold; but I like to be warm and dirty!'

<sup>1</sup> John Oxenham, *All's Well*.

But though some of us object to soap, I wonder if we should care to be without it altogether. Should we really like everything to be grubby—clothes and beds, curtains and tablecloths and towels? Should we like—not stopping at being ordinarily grubby, but going on getting grubbier and grubbier? For that is how things would be if we had no soap and nothing to take its place. After all, a bit of soap is not such a bad thing.

Now there is a kind of soap I want you all to carry with you. It is the soap of good humour and of charitableness that helps to wash out the little stains that would soil and spoil our lives. Has anybody hurt your feelings or played you a shabby trick? Then get out your bit of soap quickly and wash it from your mind. Don't rub in the stain deeper or add to its size by foolish broodings and exaggerations of your own. Laugh at yourself and get rid of it as fast as you can. Is anybody saying unkind or untrue things about some one you know? Out with your bit of soap and clean up your friend's character. Don't—however much you may feel tempted to do so—don't add to the stains that are being put upon it. Don't put stains on your own heart and conscience by making your friend appear any blacker.

One thing more I should like you to remember. It is that there are stains which no bit of soap of ours can wash out—the stains of our own sins. Only God can wash these away, and He will do it if we ask Him.

A missionary to India tells the story of how one of his converts became a Christian. The man was a Hindu, and the thought of his sins lay like a great weight upon him. He believed that if he could only bathe in the waters of the Ganges at the sacred city of Benares he would be cleansed from his sin. So for many weary miles he dragged himself to the river upon his elbows and knees. At last, weak and worn to a shadow, he reached the waters, and uttering a prayer to Gunga he crept in. But when he came out again he felt no better. The ache was still in his heart, and he lay down on the river bank utterly weary and hopeless. Presently from the shade of a banyan tree near by came a voice. It was the voice of the missionary, and he was telling the story of the Cross. And the poor, sick man sprang up in great excitement. 'That's what I want!' he cried. 'That's what I

want!' So he found the cleansing that he had sought in vain from his heathen god.

And, boys and girls, that is what we all want, and what God alone, for Christ's sake, can give us.

### The Christian Year.

SEVENTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

#### Unrealities.

'Keep yourselves from idols.'—I Jn 5<sup>21</sup>.

It is not possible that John can have meant 'graven images.' There is no such allusion in all the epistle. It is pitched in too high a tone. Neither in his other epistles, nor in his gospel, is there a kindred hint. This, too, is the last word of Revelation. How, then, are we to understand it? Paul says, 'An idol is *nothing in the world*' (R.V. 'We know that no idol is anything in the world,' 1 Co 7<sup>4</sup>). And this within touch of the statue of Jove himself. So an idol stands with Paul and John for something *unreal*. We may read, 'Keep yourselves from unrealities,' or, as Carlyle would have it, 'from shams.' Moreover, this meaning is confirmed by another word—'genuine,' or 'real,' or 'true,' which John has just been using. 'We are in Him who is *real*—Jesus Christ the reality.' 'True' does not quite translate the idea. A proposition is true. A thing or person is real. True is the opposite of false. Real is opposed to the unreal—the sham.

What are the unrealities of which we are in danger, and from which we should keep ourselves? The whole epistle has been treating of them. They gather round two centres—Christ and Christianity. The Apostle labours to show when our conception of Christ is unreal and protests against it; and when our conception of Christianity is unreal and warns us against that. Let us consider his teaching on both points.

1. When is our conception of Christ unreal? When it leaves out either of two things—His humanity or divinity. Let us listen to what John says on the first: 'He who denies that Jesus Christ came in the flesh.' We are urged to confess *Jesus*. It is a remarkable thing about the epistles, the bold way in which they speak of the humanity of Jesus. Remember that the Christ risen was worshipped and recognized as Lord. Yet, as we read the story of His life, we are told, in the most lucid style, of the babe in swaddling clothes; that

He sleeps; that He is weary at the well; that He confesses His ignorance of some things. Now, the first unreality about Christ from which we are to flee is that which omits all this. There is a danger. He is our blessed Lord—yes; He is Christ—risen, glorified, omnipotent. But He has been man—like me—with my limitations, infirmities, sympathies. He was the son of Mary, a brother, one of the family, perfectly human. Miss this, and how much you miss! How unreal Christ becomes! You miss His representativeness. You miss His sympathy with weakness. You miss His example. Christ, as *He* was, so am *I* to be in *this world*.

But there is another unreal way of thinking of Christ on which the Apostle dwells, and to which he alludes when he says, 'Flee from unrealities'—that which leaves out or obscures His divinity. Let us listen to John on this point—that *Jesus is the Son of God*. 'Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God abideth in him and he in God' (1 Jn 4<sup>15</sup>). And he is very insistent on the fact that he means Son in no accommodated sense. Not as delegate; not becoming a Son by incarnation; not son in any sense as we are sons. He is very clear, very strong, very incisive. He speaks of the Son as 'from the beginning' of the 'Eternal Life which was with the Father'—He is 'the only begotten Son'—'The Father sent the Son'—'This is the true God and Eternal Life.' And in these very Gospels which tell us of His humanity most explicitly—Matthew, Mark, and Luke—in all of them they speak of a pre-existing Son of God, who, as a babe, comes into His humanity.

Yes, just as a Christ not perfectly man is unreal, so a Christ not a pre-existent Eternal Son is unreal. And what danger lies in all this! 'A Christ as an unique exemplar of sinless humanity, an unapproachable teacher of morals, a perfect ideal of humanity, King of the kingdom of God! This is the essence of Royalty'—says the great popular teacher Harnack in his book in many languages. *No*, it is the play of *Hamlet* without Hamlet. It is an unreality. There is no existent Christ behind such a representation.

Flee from this unreality, leave out the Divinity, and there is no connexion between Jesus and the love of God—there is no key to human history. There would be no primal ideal Son according to whom man was created—no Father of whom all



families are created. God would be a mathematical unity, not a warm, living, loving, intro-active unity in plurality. No Son, then no Father. Leave out Divinity, and there is no living glorified King. There is no Mediator between God and man. There is no infinite expiation.

2. But as the Apostle has in view an unreal Christ, so also he has in view an unreal Christianity. And when, according to the Apostle, is our conception of it unreal?

There are three effects of belief in a true Christ necessary to make our Christianity true. Let us look at them.

*First.* If I know Christ as the Son of Man—God in humanity—then I know Him as my Master, my Lord and Exemplar. His word is law to me: His life is my pattern; in His steps I plant mine. That follows by logical consequence. What astounding knowledge, what wondrous belief is this of a God-Man who lived thirty-three years here to set the perfect example and share my temptations!

*Next.* If I know Christ as *the Son of God*, then I love God and Him, and my fellow-men. How can it be otherwise? What knowledge is this of a Divine Son who became Man and went to the Cross, which does not make me *love* also! Herein we know love.

*Lastly.* If I know Christ as the Son of God and Son of Man, I have fellowship of Life Eternal. For I know that my sins have been borne, expiated. I am reconciled in Him to God. Thus I have contact with the fullness of life which is in Him. It overflows and communicates itself to me. What knowledge is this of the Divine Redeemer, of Eternal Life, which was with the Father, and manifested to us, which does not thus overflow to me!

This, then, is real Christianity. But to know, or rather, say I know Him, and not realize these effects, is to have a sham Christianity, and, in fact, shows that my knowledge of Christ is a sham knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

#### EIGHTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

##### Brotherhood.

'Ye are my brethren.'—2 S 19<sup>12</sup>.

The Gospel on its practical side is brotherhood. The content of this idea is large, but it cannot be

<sup>1</sup> H. J. Piggott, *Life and Letters*.

supposed to mean less than these four things: equal rights for all, the supremacy of the common good, mutual dependence and service, and active goodwill to all.

1. *Equal rights for all.*—The Gospel of Jesus is pure democracy. Jesus trusted the people as completely as the greater part of those who teach in His name distrust them. Many fancy themselves democrats because, as they say, they believe in 'the rule of the people'; but these are half-hearted democrats who, on cross-examination, avow their belief in the rule of the people, not by the people themselves, but 'by a representative part of the people,' wiser and better fitted to rule than the whole people. A genuine democrat is one who believes heartily in the whole people and rejoices that he is one of them. If there was a 'lower class' in the day of Jesus, He belonged to it; if there were any 'common people,' He was one of them. The true disciple of Jesus offers the Pharisee's prayer, with the negative omitted: 'O God, I thank thee that I am as other men are.' He gladly shares the common lot.

One of Abraham Lincoln's truest sayings was: 'No man is good enough to govern another man without that man's consent.' It is easier, as all human experience shows, to educate a democracy to govern itself than to train a 'better class' to rule the rest of the people. Power is corrupting except when diffused. When everybody has as much power as anybody, tyranny and corruption vanish together. It is no question of a vicious aristocracy—every class is vicious. The working class is no more righteous, no more worthy to bear rule, than any other, and only flatterers and deceivers tell the working class otherwise. The three-cornered struggle now in progress between organizations, each claiming to represent the true interests of the workers, is testimony irrefutable that the workers yield to the temptations of class selfishness as quickly as any other class. The trades unions of the American Federation of Labour are a labour aristocracy that looks with disdain on the interests of the unskilled labour of the Industrial Workers of the World, while the Socialist Party claims to have at heart the interests of both, but is in imminent danger of failing to gain the confidence of either. There is no way out of the labyrinth but the way of Jesus: the Gospel of brotherhood and equal rights.

2. *The supremacy of the common good.*—This

negatives all selfish striving, all merely personal ambition. It strikes at the root of all modern business enterprise, the end of which is personal profit without regard to the common good. Jesus called the concentrated wealth of His time Mammon, and said plainly to those who would be His disciples, 'You cannot serve God and Mammon.' But His Church to-day knows better; it serves both—God with the lip, Mammon with the heart. It cannot be denied: that bastard, cringing, sycophantic thing that our age calls Christianity is nothing else than the organized worship of Mammon. Mammon is the god of this present world, and all who desire to increase their material possessions rather than their spiritual, all who are actuated by ambition rather than by love, all who would be greatest rather than least, rule rather than serve, are his willing worshippers and slaves. Righteousness, truth, and love are foolishness to Mammon; they are an unpractical ideal; there is no profit in them. But in the sight of Jesus they are the whole of life, all that makes life worth living. Mammon urges men to multiply their possessions; Jesus urges men to enrich their souls. Mammon is property, and that the world may move forward and upward Mammon must fall. For Mammon is the parent of typhoid and tuberculosis; Mammon drives our daughters into prostitution and our sons into prison; Mammon builds the slum and populates it; Mammon permits some to feast sumptuously and to play, while it compels others to toil and sweat and gnaw crusts; Mammon creates the conflict of classes and prepares revolutions; Mammon is the arch-enemy of God and man.

How futile, in view of this teaching of Jesus, is most of what passes for religion. 'To such a pass has the Church come that it fights under the banner of Jesus against His Gospel. It wields the sword of the Spirit—to quench all that is spiritual. It uses the word of God—in order to falsify the divine. It is pious, but its piety is godlessness.'<sup>1</sup> The man who piously trusts in the blood of Jesus to save him,<sup>2</sup> but owns a tenement on which there

is no fire escape, will find that the blood of Jesus was shed in vain, so far as he is concerned, if that house burns and destroys the lives of its inmates. For that man is nothing less than a murderer, and a far greater criminal than the man who in passion takes the life of his fellow, for he slays in cold blood and for mere sordidness. That sort of faith without works is the deadest of all things that profess to be spiritual. The Christianity of our day is mainly of that type; it is a Christianity of ostentatious orthodoxy, of large professions, that scorns the real Gospel of Jesus. The hard self-righteousness of the Christian world rules it out of the kingdom of brotherhood. Now, as of old, it is easier to bring the Prodigal home than to soften the proud elder son and make him a true child of his gracious Father.

3. *Mutual dependance and service.*—Jesus could not grant their mother's prayer for the sons of Zebedee, and place them on His right hand and His left in the kingdom, because these seats were not to be given away as a favour, being reserved as a reward for service. The high places are for those who seek the good of others, not their own—for those who drink their Master's cup of sacrifice, for those who are baptized with the baptism of His vicarious suffering.

This is what Jesus meant by His teaching regarding stewardship. He taught men that they do not own, but owe; that their rights are far less important than their duties. Power, wealth, learning are not means of ministering to one's selfishness, but opportunities for the service of one's fellows. Those who have most must serve most. The greatest in the kingdom is he that makes fullest and wisest use of his opportunities and rises to eminence as servant of all. Stewardship is the exact opposite of exploitation, the selfish using of one's fellows to advance one's own interest and increase one's own wealth. Stewardship is as exactly opposed also to the selfishness of the idle rich, who devote all their energies to 'pleasure'—and secure only their own boredom.

Brotherhood does not imply that all men shall serve in the same way, or that the service of all is equally valuable; but brotherhood does imply that all shall serve. The man who refuses to

complete atonement of sin through the blood of Jesus Christ once offered, and through that alone.' This was hailed by the orthodox religious press as 'a wonderful testimony.' It was.

<sup>1</sup> Kutter, *They Must*, p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> The late J. Pierpont Morgan inserted in his will the following profession of faith: 'I commit my soul into the hands of my Saviour, in full confidence that, having redeemed it and washed it in His most precious blood, He will present it faultless before the throne of my Heavenly Father; and I entreat my children to maintain and defend, at all hazard, and at any cost of personal sacrifice, the blessed doctrine of



serve denies his brotherhood and puts himself outside the pale of human society. There is no place for such a man in a rightly ordered world. He is the true outlaw, and by his own act. This is the teaching of Jesus. His disciples must proclaim and exemplify it, and let Nietzsche rage and Bernard Shaw imagine a vain thing.

4. *Active goodwill to all.*—This is the 'altruism' of which Comte and all whom he has influenced have had so much to say. But Paul long anticipated Comte when he said, 'Let every man look not upon his own things, but also upon the things of others.' And Jesus was before Paul, declaring, as the highest ideal of men in their social relations, 'Whatsoever things ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them.' The ideal of brotherhood is not merely to abstain from doing evil to men, but actively to do them good. And the Gospel of Jesus inflexibly maintains this as the practical side of religion, without which no piety is of least avail. 'For if a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?' The principle is as sweeping as it obviously is true. And here is one application of it that every man should heed: If a man does not realize, abominate, repent, and forsake his sins against his brother whom he has seen, how can he have any genuine realization of sin against a God whom he has not seen; and how can he repent sin unrealized?<sup>1</sup>

#### NINETEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

##### The Law of the Spirit of Life.

'There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus. For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and death.'—Ro 8<sup>1,2</sup>.

Deliverance came through life. Christ our Lord specifically defined His reason for coming into the world. In Jn 10<sup>10</sup> He says: 'I came that they may have life, and may have it abundantly.' In Lk 19<sup>10</sup> He says: 'For the Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost.' There is one remarkable passage that unites the two. The Father pleading for the Prodigal Son says: 'For this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost and is found' (Lk 15<sup>24</sup>). He was dead and lost, and is alive and found! He was dead before he was lost, and he was alive

again before he was found; he was found when he was again alive.

The gift of God in Christ Jesus is the gift of Life. To this all the New Testament Scriptures bear witness. 'And the witness is this, that God gave unto us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath the life; he that hath not the Son hath not the life' (1 Jn 5<sup>11, 12</sup>). Jesus never used the words 'Life' and 'Death' for mere existence and physical dissolution, except under the constraint of necessity. The words had for Him a far deeper content. He regarded men apart from Him as destitute of life. They were 'dead.' 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgement; but hath passed out of death into life' (Jn 5<sup>24</sup>). Of those who heard His voice some were dead, others had passed out of death into life. The aim of Evangelism is to bring people to Jesus that they may receive the gift of Life; abundant, eternal Life.

What is Eternal Life? Our Lord interpreted it to be the knowledge of God through His Son, 'And this is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send' (Jn 17<sup>3</sup>). St. John in his Epistle explains that saying: 'We know that we are of God . . . and we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we know him that is true, and we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life' (1 Jn 5<sup>19, 20</sup>). Eternal Life is an experimental knowledge of God in Christ; an assurance of sonship with God in Christ; and a conscious fellowship with God in Christ.

The religion of the New Testament is the experience of Eternal Life in Jesus Christ. It is not a form of doctrine, not a routine of ritual, not an ethic, not a cult, not even a system of religion. It is an experience of Life. 'He that hath the Son hath the life; he that hath not the Son hath not the life.' This teaching is not peculiar to St. John. It is the witness of the New Testament. 'No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him' (Mt 11<sup>27</sup>). 'And in none other is there salvation: neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, wherein we must be saved' (Ac 4<sup>12</sup>). 'The free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord' (Ro 6<sup>28</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> H. C. Vedder, *The Gospel of Jesus and the Problems of Democracy*.

All life is subject to law, and all life is subject to its own law. The Life that is of the Spirit is subject to the law of the Spirit of Life. All life is a gift. It can neither be bought nor won. All life comes by birth. It cannot be either organized or evolved. Spiritual Life is no exception to these universal laws. It is not of works, neither can it be evolved out of the natural man. Evangelical truth concludes all men under condemnation of death, and all alike equally helpless to attain or acquire eternal life. Jesus Christ bases the universal necessity for regeneration upon this universal law of life and death: 'Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born of water and the Spirit he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. Marvel not that I said unto thee, ye must be born again.'<sup>1</sup>

TWENTIETH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

War no more.

'Neither shall they learn war any more.'—Is 2<sup>4</sup>.

We are confronted at the outset with the incontestable fact that war has been a constant and well-nigh universal feature of human history. Among many primitive peoples it has been regarded as almost the only fit occupation for a full-grown man. In the empires of antiquity it was the one great enterprise of the nation and the chief glory of its kings, and those empires which forgot it perished. In Europe, by means of an empire established through war and guarded at all points by arms, Rome for a time preserved an uncertain peace. But on the collapse of Rome Europe was again given over to conflict, and, for centuries, no power rose strong enough to maintain order. With the rise of the modern states and of strong centralized governments, warfare has become more circumscribed, but never a decade has passed in Europe without some part being engaged in war. If Christendom had copied the Roman institution of the Temple of Janus, it could scarcely ever have been closed throughout the nineteen centuries of the Christian era. The history of Asia and Africa is an even blacker record of bloodshed. The honour paid to the warrior has in most countries exceeded that of

any other class of men, as the literature of all ages bears witness. 'Saul hath slain his thousands and David his ten thousands'—this is the standard by which men have been accounted great. It is true that there has been at all times an undercurrent of protest and disgust; but the normal attitude of men, at least towards successful war, has been one of approbation and of pride. Victories in battle have been the events which nations have commemorated as their greatest national glories.

This prevalence of war in human history is but one aspect of the universal struggle for existence which held sway ages before man appeared on the earth, and which so far as we can tell has always been a dominating factor in physical life. 'Strife is the father of all things,' said a Greek philosopher; and a section of modern thinkers maintains that the struggle for existence is an essential element in human life, that war can never be eliminated, and that all attempts to do away with it are but ludicrous efforts, on the part of man to fight against the inevitable laws of his existence. Any adequate attempt to deal with the scientific and philosophical basis of this view would carry us far from our proper subject, but a few points having a direct bearing on our subject must be mentioned.

1. The 'biological necessity of war' has been maintained by several distinct lines of argument.

(1) First it is said that war by killing off the weak and inefficient individuals of both sides, and leaving the strongest to survive, definitely improves the human race. This argument need not detain us. It is, at any rate in modern times, the reverse of the truth. Those who are most likely to be killed are in fact the fittest and best, while the weak and unfit are left at home to become the parents of the next generation.

(2) A stronger argument is that based on national or racial grounds. It is said that certain nations or races are by nature superior and others inferior, and that it will be for the general advancement of mankind if the former live and multiply, and, where their interests conflict, even exterminate the latter. Now, as regards nations, it can hardly be denied that at any particular era some are in advance of others, but history will not bear out the contention that this superiority is maintained. It would rather seem that there is constant rise and fall. Consequently the blotting out of one

<sup>1</sup> S. Chadwick, in *Evangelism*, ed. E. Aldom French.



by another might merely destroy the prospect of future advance. It is, however, held by some that racial (as distinct from national) characteristics are permanent, and that it is all important to preserve the finer racial stocks. This is a matter of acute controversy among specialists on the subject, and one on which only a specialist has a right to offer an opinion. Even if it be granted, however, that some racial stocks remain permanently superior, that does not show that the best or the necessary way to preserve them is by war. Here again the tendency of war, successful or otherwise, seems rather to destroy the finer stocks. The decadence of Greece has been traced to the destruction of her best elements in the Peloponnesian and other wars; the decadence of Spain to her using up her best in the effort to maintain an overgrown Empire. Moreover, where there is no extermination but merely subjugation of a conquered race, the result is a tyranny which is often enervating and finally destructive to the conquerors, as apparently happened with the Romans and other dominant races.

(3) But the strongest argument for the necessity of war is based simply on the actual growth of population and its need of food. Under favourable conditions the human race multiplies with great rapidity. The population of England and Wales, for example, increased from about nine millions in 1801 to thirty-seven millions in 1914; that of Java under Dutch rule 'from five millions in 1825 to twenty-eight and a half millions in the first decade of this century.' Famine and the general pressure of want, and to a lesser extent disease and war, are the usual factors which keep population in check; but, it is said, a world where there was security against war and where famine and disease were increasingly rare would rapidly become over-populated, and the only recourse would be to wars of extermination. Even without looking so far ahead, at the present day certain countries are congested and seeking an outlet. Can this be secured except through war?

Now, as regards the prospect of an over-populated world, it may at any rate be said that this is still a long way off. Immense tracts of the earth's surface, Canada, South America, Australia, for example, are as yet very sparsely populated; and in the more densely inhabited countries the possibilities of increasing food supply are in many cases immense. Over large parts of Russia, for

example, even elementary crop-rotation is scarcely understood, and the immense gains which accrue from more scientific methods of agriculture even in highly developed countries were demonstrated in Germany in the years preceding the war. Vast sources of supplies still remain untapped. Nitrates (as fertilizers) from the air is one recent example; while the food supplies of the oceans have been no more than touched. The world can thus maintain a vastly larger population than at present, and though over-population is theoretically possible it is likely that before that stage is reached checks will have come into play. The more advanced countries show a constant slackening of the rate of increase. In France the population is well-nigh stationary, and the same tendency is seen in other countries.

2. But if we repudiate the theory that war is a biological necessity, the fact of its prevalence throughout human history cannot be gainsaid. Is it really possible, or conceivable, that an activity of men so widespread and so far-reaching in its results can ever be eliminated? Does not history go to prove that man is a fighting animal, and can we alter that fact?

Now, admitting the wide prevalence of war, there are many facts to show that the general development of mankind has been not towards but away from it. Taking a long view over past history, we can see that the area of conflict has become more circumscribed. Larger and larger groups have abrogated the custom of war among their members. As families of men have merged into tribes, tribes or cities into nations, nations into empires, in each case there has been a wider area within which men lived in peace. Irregular conflicts—once prevalent inside the state—have tended to disappear. The duel has practically gone; the right of private war, as exercised, for example, by mediæval nobles, has disappeared; privateering at sea has gone; civil war, once not uncommon, is now regarded as a thing to be avoided at all costs. This advance has been due to several factors. One has been the growth of strong central governments, and the establishment of such institutions as law-courts and legislatures, by which justice is established and the necessity for the forcible settlement of differences removed. But more important, and indeed the basis upon which such institutions rest, is the growth of

popular sentiment against internal war, the sense that it is disastrous to the well-being of the state and its members, and in fact disruptive of the state itself. How far we have travelled in this direction is shown by the loathing with which civilized men look on civil war. It seems an unnatural thing, portending a return to barbarism.

These various types of conflict having been left behind, there appears to be a strong pre-supposition that international war may eventually follow them. The very fact that states have often found it possible to unite and thereby to do away with hostility among their members, seems to show that conflict is not a necessity. Is there any fundamental reason why, at some future date, men may not come to loathe the very thought of war between England and Germany as much as they would now loathe the thought of it between different parts of England, among which wars were frequent in Anglo-Saxon times? Men of French, German, and Italian blood now live peaceably together in Switzerland. Why should it be impossible for the French, German, and Italian nations as a whole to learn to live in peace?

3. Such a society is already in process of building. The supposition of the independence and rivalry of states, upon which so much of our international policy is based, does not in reality correspond with facts. It is not true that nations are self-contained entities whose interests touch only to conflict. It is much more true to say that they are interdependent, each needing much from and supplying much to others, and each gaining or suffering through the prosperity or adversity of its neighbours. This may not always have been the case in the past; at the present day it is one of the outstanding facts to be reckoned with in any correct outlook on the world.

The scientists and inventors of the last century and a half set in motion forces which have changed the face of the world, making it radically different from any preceding stage in its history, and of the changes the greatest is this, that the nations have been linked and welded and even pounded together, so that whether they will or no their destinies are interlinked, for good or evil. For us who live in the scientific and mechanical era it is almost impossible by any stretch of the imagination to realize how vast the change has been, but some appreciation of it is a necessity, and

neglect to pay sufficient attention to its results is one of the causes of the disasters of the present day.

(1) First and most fundamental has been the development of communications and transport. If one was asked what was the most notable change in the appearance of the earth's surface during the last hundred years the answer should probably be railway lines. Railways, steamships, motor transport, the telegraph and telephone have linked the ends of the earth together, and the aeroplane will carry the process yet further. The freedom of movement which they have made possible has opened up every continent. Less than a century ago the interior of Africa was a blank on the map, China and Japan were closed countries, a European in most parts of Asia was a strange phenomenon, as was an Indian in England. Now the exploration of the globe is practically complete, as is symbolized by the reaching of both Poles: with minor exceptions there are no new lands to be visited or new peoples dragged into the light. One stage of the world's development is done. All nations can now know one another.

(2) So far as the things of the mind are concerned the world is one. Science is plainly international. Investigations started in France may be developed or verified in America or Japan. Literature and art overstep national boundaries. An important book written in any country is translated into half a dozen or more languages. In London dramas from Russia or Norway or Spain occupy the theatres; there are exhibitions of the art of Persia or Japan. Meanwhile Shakespeare is acted by Indian companies in Calcutta or Bombay; and in the picture-houses of Yokohama and Baghdad the spirit of white civilization is interpreted by wild west dramas or Charlie Chaplin. As regards systematic education, we find schools and colleges of western learning spread through Africa and the East, and, though less conspicuous, schools for oriental studies in most western countries; we find migrations of students from India, China, and Japan to Europe and America; from the Slav countries to Western Europe; from South America to France and Spain; and many similar movements.

(3) The opportunities of personal contact between members of various nations have been immensely increased. There are many more people in Great Britain to-day who can claim to



have seen Russia or Japan than a century ago would have travelled as far as France. The mere amusement of travel (in earlier days not an amusement but a risk), curiosity, sport, business, take into foreign lands all manner of people who a century ago would have thought it an adventure to move to a different county. For each of them travel means contact with foreigners and the establishing of some kind of relationship with them. There is at least acquaintance; there is an opportunity for friendship and for some understanding of them and their country.

(4) The mutual dependence of nations in regard to the primary necessities of life has made them, whether they will or no, concerned in one another's interests. This is partially recognized in matters of organization. Commercial or manufacturing companies, shipping companies, banks, have tended recently to become international in character, operating in several countries, and having men of several countries as shareholders and

directors. And if there has been a drawing together of those who control industry or trade, the same is true of the workers. Men employed in a certain industry in Great Britain may be vitally affected by the wages paid and the hours worked in the same industry in Italy or Japan. A sudden influx of cheap goods produced by cheap labour in the Far East might throw thousands of British workmen out of employment; the same result would follow more surely from the degrading of sections of European labour to Asiatic standards of living—a possibility not altogether remote at present. So labour organizations in various countries have come to feel that their aims and objects are common, and have united to further those aims, both in political organizations such as the Socialist Internationals, and in federations of men employed in some particular industry, such as the International Conference of Miners.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> B. C. Waller, *Towards the Brotherhood of Nations*.

## The Central Problems of Faith.

BY THE REVEREND F. R. TENNANT, D.D., LECTURER ON THEOLOGY AND FELLOW of TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

'Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.'—He 11<sup>1</sup>.

THE familiar chapter which opens with these words dwells upon certain aspects of faith such as do not receive emphasis elsewhere in the New Testament. For instance, it is not the faith of the Christian, as distinguished from other people, that is there discussed: it is faith in its widest or most general sense—faith in the abstract. The examples of the faithful life which follow upon the description of faith which I have just quoted are indeed all taken from the Old Testament, and therefore from times previous to the Christian age; and among them we observe the harlot Rahab, one of 'them that believed not' in the God of Israel. Again, the object of faith, as it is here described, is not restricted, as it usually is, to Christ or even to God. In the writings of the Apostle Paul, faith is treated as possessing efficacy in so far as it is due to being trust in Christ or in God; in the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the other

hand, it is the efficacy of the instrument, of faith in itself as an attitude of mind issuing in the higher life, that is maintained with all the writer's wealth of illustration. And the object to which faith directs itself is asserted to be the whole region of the future and the unseen. Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen, whatsoever these may be: perhaps the eternal archetypes, the 'intelligible realities,' of which the things that are seen and are temporal, are, in the writer's habitual phrase, the patterns, examples, or shadows; just as for Plato time was the moving shadow of eternity.

It is these invisible and eternal realities, then, of which faith is said to be the substance, or to which faith gives substantiality, and for which it is, or supplies, evidence. So runs the definition contained in our text. But what are we to understand by its unwonted and somewhat surprising terms? Certainly we cannot take the author of the Epistle to mean that our faith constitutes the existence of

its objects, that their reality consists in and is exhausted by their being believed in by human subjects, that their *esse* is *percipi*; for the possibility would then seem to be left open that they are no more than the dream-products of our subjective fancy, the figments of our minds: which is the opposite of what the writer assumes and maintains. It cannot then be the reality or existence of things hoped for and unseen as they are in themselves, or as they *sub specie æternitatis* from the point of view of God, that faith is here said to constitute; it can only be their reality—in a quite different sense of that ambiguous word—for the believer's present experience, their actuality for *his* life. The idea which we are in quest of to explain the substantiality here spoken of and to interpret the writer's meaning, is in fact that expressed in our word 'realize,' in one of its commoner senses. We well know the difference between an event that has just happened, or is about to happen, to us, before we have discerned the implicit import with which it is fraught, and the same event after that its significance and its consequences have revealed themselves to our mind; when, that is to say, the event is realized by us, and has become for us something with which we have to reckon, something which can influence our thought and modify our action. Faith, we are given to understand, is exactly such 'realization.' It brings us into actual relations with what was indeed already there, but which perhaps had been as yet, as we say, nothing to us. And so we may feel certain that the Revised Version gives us a really apt translation of our writer's original words when it represents him as saying 'faith is the assurance of things hoped for': the strong personal conviction, the moral certitude, which renders our practical concern with them a possibility. If I may invent for the moment a distinction between words which unfortunately do not differ in meaning, faith may be said to be subjective certitude as to matters concerning which we cannot claim knowledge characterized by objective certainty.

The hoped for and the unseen, indeed, are not objects of such knowledge. We walk by faith precisely when we cannot walk by sight. But just as increased knowledge widens our horizon within the realm of the things that are seen, and thereby opens out access to manifold new relationships, to a fuller and more complex life; so faith enlarges yet further our intellectual horizon, till it includes

even the unseen Beyond, and enables the believer to establish touch here and now with the unknown side of what we know but in part, and with the invisible aspect of what we see but as in a glass and darkly. At least that is the grand assumption, the great adventure, of faith, as faith is defined by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And the gist of his teaching could hardly find happier expression than in Hartley Coleridge's lines on faith:

Think not faith, by which the just shall live  
Is a dead creed, a map correct of heaven;  
Far less a feeling fond and fugitive,  
A thoughtless gift, withdrawn as soon as given;  
It is an affirmation and an act  
That binds eternal truth to present fact.

I have spoken of the grand assumption which underlies the assertion made in our text concerning the real existence of the unseen world which faith enables us to realize. And no sermon on faith, on the mental attitude of believingness, would at the present time minister to, or at any rate satisfy, the needs of thoughtful people if it concealed or passed lightly over the element of unproved assumption which inheres to some extent in all religious faith, in its intellectual or cognitive aspect. I wish therefore now to bring that element of assumption into the focus of our attention.

The central problem of faith, the problem which may press at times upon any believer and provide trial for his faith, is the question whether we can justify to our reason this leap from what we deem the *terra firma* of knowledge into hope, trust, or belief, as to what we do not know and cannot rigidly prove. Can we give to others or to ourselves a reason for the hope, for the faith, that is in us? Can we Christians satisfactorily meet the charge that we are but light-hearted and credulous upholders of cunningly devised fables, or the assertion that the unseen beyond in which our faith expatiates is but a world of shadows cast by our own minds, rather than a real world of which the temporal and the visible is a fragmentary or distorted appearance? The common saying that 'seeing is believing,' taken, as it always is, to mean that believing is seeing, may be strictly speaking a contradiction in terms; but it gives expression to a habit of mind that springs up as perennially as hope: a habit of mind, moreover, which is by no means dispensable in many of the affairs of



ordinary practical life, and one which is inimical to faith as well as to credulity. Can we, in the religious department of our activity, afford to set it wholly aside? Faith, some may tell us, may be the realization of the hoped for and the unseen; but what, they may ask, of the reality of the hoped for and the unseen, which faith does not constitute? Short of possessing knowledge and proof of such things, are we not indulging in ungrounded assumptions when we speak of establishing relations with them?

The classical chapter on faith from which we have set out does not contain any explicit attempt to justify to our reason this element of venture in faith. The chapter indeed abounds in illustrations of the fact that faith issues in a higher life than is possible without it. It enumerates many examples of the heroic life which faith had inspired men of old to achieve. You will recall that it tells how Abel, Enoch and Noah, the patriarchs and Moses, and a long series of national deliverers, kings and prophets, had been enabled to gain material or moral victories, to endure afflictions and to surmount trials, or to win spiritual rewards, solely in virtue of faith's possession of their souls. However, the power of a great belief, once it is held with unquestioning conviction, to produce strenuous activity or spiritual endeavour, is one thing; and the correspondence of the same belief with external reality or fact is another. Experience now and again enforces this distinction upon us, however ardently some have tried to annul it; for we well know that beliefs such as have proved to be not really true to fact have sometimes inspired men to do, to dare, and to die. There has always lived in my memory, in this connexion, a ballad describing how a very commonplace young man was transfigured, by his belief in the exalted nobility and purity of his lover, into a hero; yet she turned out to have been all the time a worthless and depraved woman. Spiritual efficacy, then, although a criterion of true religious belief, is by no means so exclusively a characteristic of true belief that we can infallibly or without exception infer the one from the other. None of us doubts that life is more than logic, that reality is richer than thought and unexhausted by knowledge, or that advantages of the highest and noblest kind do actually accrue from believing where we cannot see. But our faith will perhaps still be liable to be beset with a certain shrinking fearfulness unless

we can further justify to ourselves the reasonableness of its venture or assure ourselves as to the clairvoyance of blind hope.

I have already remarked that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, whose guidance we are following, does not explicitly concern himself with our present problem. I would now observe, however, that implicitly he suggests the clue to the most satisfying solution of it that, as it seems to me, we can hope to discover.

You will recollect the most impressive of all the examples of faith which his eleventh chapter contains—that of the father of the faithful. 'By faith Abraham . . . when he was called to go out into a place which he should hereafter receive for an inheritance, obeyed and went out, not knowing whither he went.' The father of the Hebrew race, leaving his Mesopotamian home and forsaking the Nature-worship of his ancestors, hearkening to the inward summons to go forward, 'not knowing whither,' may be regarded as a prophetic type of the whole religious history of Israel; of that forgetting of things that were behind and reaching forth unto what was before, of recognizing mystery behind the familiar, which rendered the Hebrew race unique in its religious insight, in spite of its being about the least philosophically minded of civilized peoples. And the figure of Abraham stands for yet more than this. He has been looked upon, and rightly, as an allegory of the moral, and as, we may make bold to say, of the intellectual progress of the world. For he is a concrete embodiment of the principle 'nothing venture, nothing have.' And that principle is not only the essence of all religious faith; it also underlies the acquisition of all human knowledge of the actual world—at least of all the knowledge which we account most worth having.

Neither we as individuals, nor mankind as a race, began with knowledge, or even with knowing. We began with learning, and with learning chiefly through doing. We learned sometimes by success, sometimes by failure. In either case we ventured before we could have. And without this exercise of primitive faith—or credulity if you will—mankind would never have begun to acquire its sciences or its civilization. For instance, the law of causality, or the principle of the uniformity of Nature, was not written so large or so legibly upon natural phenomena that, in the time of man's primitiveness, he who ran could read it off. On the other hand,

had it not been hoped for and tentatively assumed, here a little and there a little and line upon line, the principle never could have come to have 'substance' for man's knowledge—that is to say, relevance to his life; had it not been believed or trusted in while as yet undiscerned and unverified, while belonging rather to the realm of mystery than to that of familiarity, there never would have emerged any 'evidence' of its actuality. And even to-day, I may remark in passing, the uniformity of Nature, as relating either to the future or to the past which preceded scientific observation, though the certainty of every prediction of science, and all the prudence of common sense, depend upon it, is, from the point of view of logic, a postulate only; or rather, as has quite recently been brought to light, a group of postulates. It is a belief for which there is no *a priori* necessity, for which full empirical proof is of course out of the question, and yet which every induction presupposes. Thus mankind have always been subject to the necessity of believing, hoping, or trusting in the rationality of the world while this was as yet undemonstrated, before they could proceed to erect the edifice of knowledge, or even to lay its foundations. Mankind's case, with respect to knowledge, has therefore been fundamentally the same, and must for ever remain fundamentally the same, as that of the Christian in respect of faith, who, before he can come to God, must first believe that He is. *Credo ut intelligam*, or venture before victory, describes what actually has been, and indeed what necessarily must have been, the attitude of the human mind in virtue of which it has attained to its religion and its science alike. I do not mean to imply that all the dogmas of the religious are necessarily on a par, in respect of probability, with the more settled convictions of the scientific; but I submit that the antithesis between knowledge and belief is commonly exaggerated beyond the limits within which the logician assigns it significance or validity; that knowledge has always contained and must for ever continue to contain an element of faith that ordinary language has tended to conceal; and that within the sphere of knowledge or science, as well as within that of religion, probability is the guide of life. Both, like Abraham, have gone forth 'not knowing whither'; both have by their primitive faith obtained their first glimpse of the places they should afterward receive as their inheritance.

And so we might adopt the illustrative method of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews and lengthen out indefinitely the chain of examples of the efficacy of faith which his eleventh chapter presents to us. We might generalize from Israel's religion to humanity's knowledge. By faith, we might say (or by hope, if we wished to be historically correct and literally accurate), Newton founded all physics on his three simple laws of motion; by faith the atomists of ancient Greece conceived the reign of law throughout the material universe; by faith primitive man made possible all subsequent science, philosophy, and theology. Thus much, I believe, we might add as matter of fact or sober truth. And perhaps it would not be a mere indulgence in phantasy if we allowed analogy to carry us a great step further. At any rate I follow high authority in presenting the suggestion that, but for the 'unconscious experimenting' of the living creatures below us in Nature's hierarchy, but for an element of venture in their behaviour comparable in some respects to that involved in the faith of rational man, there would have been no such thing as organic evolution in our world. As Professor Ward has remarked, reptiles would not have become modified into birds had they waited till first they could fly; and there was little in all the wisest fish could know to justify belief that there was more scope for existence on the land than in the water, or to show that persistent endeavours to live on land would issue in the transformation of his swim-bladder into lungs. And if these instances, so put, will seem largely fanciful, they nevertheless bring out one fact: namely, 'that when we regard the development of living forms as a continuous whole, we are forced to recognize as immanent and operative throughout it, a sort of unscientific trustfulness, that from the very first seems to have been engrained in all living things.' And so we might further extend our series of examples, and say: by something akin to faith 'the primordial slime' fashioned itself into the order and varied beauty of living Nature, and eventually into the dignity of rational and religious man. The whole world is full, fortunately, of the irrepressible tendency to venture: from amœba to man, no less than from primitive man to philosopher and theist, venture has been the source and cause of development. Every onward step in the progress of man, it would seem, has been an act not wholly warranted



by past experience alone. Indeed, the most apt description that has been given of experience is that it consists in growing expert by experiment. In the lower animals, development was not postponed until its remoter stages were found fit; in man, as we have seen, knowledge is the outcome of faith, of trying, and of postulating. Thought arose as instrumental to life. Logic may be the test of its validity, but its cause was unrest.

Now the conclusion which we have reached has an important bearing on what I have called the problem of faith. What has been said with regard to the lower realms of the living world, and has been presented only as matter of analogy, may be withdrawn, if so you will, as but embellishment. It is in any case superfluous to the argument which I have been constructing. But it will serve to vindicate the reasonableness of the attitude of faith to have pointed out that, in view of the needs of life and in the light of our rounded knowledge of the world as an apparently purposeful moral order, the will to believe, to hope, or to trust, beyond the limits within which we can coercively prove or immediately perceive, is no anomaly and no irrationality imposed on us exclusively by religion. It will serve to justify the venture, the element of assumption, involved in faith, to have shown that it is the final phase of an ascending order of ventures which are normal, natural, nay indispensable, to man: an order which begins in instinctive credulity but culminates in reasoned

and rational conviction. This conviction, moreover, is one for which all our knowledge leaves room, and to which much of our knowledge encourages. I am speaking now only with reference to the fundamental contents of religious faith in general; not as to this or that more precarious detail, which needs to be considered on its own particular evidential merits, but as to the being of God and whatever may reasonably be regarded as necessary corollaries of that belief, such, for instance, as divine self-revelation, divine providence, human immortality, personal inter-communion between God and man. It remains true that faith as to even these fundamental things must always be subjective certitude rather than objective certainty, a venture outstripping knowledge. But the venture is of the kind involved in our very knowledge itself, so that faith is not antithetic to knowledge; and indeed faith is grounded upon such knowledge as we have. If a venture, then, faith is a reasonable venture. And it is further reasonable in that, like our science, it illumines life by finding increased meaning in life as interpreted by faith. And inasmuch as the venture is evoked by life, it must find its subjective and pragmatic verification most chiefly in its enrichment and ennobling of life. Faith is thus the realization of what we have reason to assert to be real; it is the substantiation for man of what, apart from his mentality, has substance, the evidencing of what is none the less actual for its remaining unseen.

## Entre Nous.

### TWO TEXTS.

Luke xvii. 5.

'BUT it is Saturday night, and I must turn to my preparations for to-morrow. I am to preach in the morning. My subject will be, "Lord, increase our faith"; my points the following: (1) The incidental testimony to our Lord's divinity—in the request that He will bestow a spiritual gift. (2) The ascription of moral weakness to defect of faith. Christ had laid on them the duty of unlimited forgiveness; they reply, Lord, increase our faith. (3) The *wherefore* of the above—because faith brings to bear upon the soul the motive power of the unseen, the revealed.

(4) Divine action on the soul necessary to the production and increment of faith—Lord, increase . . . (5) Yet the human effort is not excluded. Christ retorts: If ye had faith, etc., as if it depended on them.'<sup>1</sup>

James i. 17.

'As usual with him he devoted much time to placing the words in their context and showing how they were led up to in the mind of the writer. He began with the double aspect of sorrow from the Christian's point of view: firstly, as a dispensation of God's, and secondly as a temptation, an

<sup>1</sup> H. J. Piggott's *Life and Letters*, p. 262.



appeal to the baser side of man's nature. He alluded to the view of a late critic that the Satan of the Book of Job is not the Devil, as we understand him, but an angel or minister of Jehovah's, charged with the duty of being the adversary or accuser of the just, somewhat as the Roman Church supports an *advocatus diaboli* at the canonization of a saint. Now the writer of the Epistle denies that God can tempt man to evil, any more than He can be tempted to evil. In enforcing his denial he rises to the counter-assertion made in the text, that every "perfect gift" comes "from above." This raises his eyes upwards and leads him on to the magnificent conception of the "Father of Lights," on whose eternal radiance no shadow is ever cast, either by the revolutions of the heavenly orbs or by the chances and changes of this mortal life.<sup>1</sup>

#### A TOPIC.

##### Exploitation.

'The crying sin of to-day is *exploitation*. The sins and weaknesses of the people are exploited under our modern civilization on a scale hitherto undreamed of. Only in these modern days of "progress" have men on the make discovered what an illimitable source of revenue is to be tapped by this means. It is the sin of *pandering*, and pandering on the Napoleonic scale. Men have sunk their capital in it, and created powerful vested interests. The poor weakling who is caught in the snare, or who succumbs to the lures spread for him on every hand, may end his days in prison or workhouse, or be quietly and decently put out of sight to die in infirmary or asylum; but the men who have traded on him, and waxed fat in so doing, are courted and fawned upon by their neighbours, and "kow-towed" to by the tradesmen and others who seek to bask in the sunshine of their ill-gotten wealth. When was the real landlord of a West End brothel ever brought to justice? When were the wife-beatings, the child-starvings or other crimes of the drunkard ever brought home to the men who have traded on his appetites? What author or cin  ma proprietor was ever adequately punished for first insinuating into the mind of lad or girl the thing that has proved their undoing? If the drunkard is to lose his immortal soul, what shall become of the drunkard-makers? And what shall become of the souls of those "Lords Spiritual"

<sup>1</sup> H. J. Piggott's *Life and Letters*, p. 267 f.

and other supporters in the House of Lords who, on the plea of "vested interests," have ever been the implacable enemies of measures dictated by mercy and directed to the helping and the saving of the people?'

That is a quotation from Arthur Bertram's *In Darkest Christendom and a Way out of the Darkness* (Allen & Unwin; cloth 5s. net, paper 3s. 6d. net). It is a book which, if read, is bound to do good; for it cries aloud and spares not. And it is being read. Published in 1919 it has already been reprinted twice.

#### NEW POETRY.

##### Victor Chard.

Mr. Perkin Warbeck of Cambridge continues his 'Florin Series' of modern poetry. Mr. Victor Chard's *Tushery* is number four. It is a flattering example. This poem, for example, flatters the series though not this number of it.

##### ETERNITY.

Like as a child upon the sea-girt shore,  
That builds, with eager heart and busy hand,  
A mimic fortress in the yellow sand,  
Until the turning wave creeps up and o'er,  
And lays all smooth again the ocean floor:  
So Man, so Life, so Time, that would withstand  
Inexorable Fate at Hope's demand,  
Toil at their futile task for evermore.

For evermore! While suns shall wax and wane,  
And pale cold moons await their final doom;  
While new worlds nebulous begin to be,  
Within the circle of Eternity.  
For evermore! Weaving upon the loom  
Of Endless Being, all their tale of pain.

##### Jocelyn C. Lea.

This is another of Mr. Warbeck's poets. We dare not call him frivolous, but he is certainly light-hearted. Quite serious, however, and therefore not quite representative is this:

##### PRUNING SONG.

Trees with the wind in their waving wands  
humming,  
Dream they those wands all in green shall be  
gowned?



Here with their pruning knives see the men  
coming—

Praying for Harvest,  
To God for good Harvest,  
And apples to last them  
Till Easter comes round!

Come to the orchard now while the light lingers,  
See how the waving wands litter the ground!  
See how the apple trees hold up stiff fingers—

Praying for Harvest,  
To God for good Harvest,  
And life for their children  
Till Easter comes round!

The title is *Purple Boggarts*.

Ralph Cleworth.

Another of the 'Florin' poets. The simple title of the volume is *Leaves*. You will find the story but search in vain for the moral in it. You must be content with this as its note, and no doubt a very charming note it is.

MADELINE.

She came into the lecture late  
And flung her haughty glances where  
Each gallant undergraduate  
Drank deeply of her willowy air:  
Tell me, you wise, why is it thus  
That ugly people in good time  
Secure their seats without a fuss  
And figure not in rhyme?

One chair, the only empty one,  
Next me, she took. 'Last time,' said he,  
'I traced' . . . the weak-eyed morning sun  
Played round her lips: futility  
I saw in all but . . . 'Aspect two'—  
Her hands were white, her hair was brown.  
'Note this' . . . Her eyes—yet there are few  
So bold but they look down.

'Three periods, I distinguish here,  
The first.'—Mysteriously I sigh.  
'But we must get the issues clear'—  
O heart, I thought, beat once and die!  
An inkdrop from her fountain pen—  
My blotting-paper? Well, not mine,  
But . . . O what mortal things are men  
When women are divine!

T. S. Cairncross.

Mr. Cairncross does not write in the Scottish language, but he is very much a Scottish writer.

The title is itself Scottish: *From the Kilpatrick Hills* (Paisley: Gardner; 6s. net). We quote a few verses of

THE CONTENTED MAN.

How happy he who in unfeigned content  
Bides in the humble cottage by the brook,  
Beholding morning dawn and red sun set!  
Among the fields his wandering hours are spent,  
And in the shade he finds a bowered nook  
For deep communion, where sweet violet  
And hill-side blue-bell tell him secret things,  
And rustling leaves are full of angels' wings.

He needs no company in his solitude;  
Nature suffices him in all his cares;  
The lonely place breathes comforting like balm;  
Here builds he high in every changing mood  
A temple for his soul with incensed prayers,  
And here himself he finds amidst the calm;  
Ambition still keeps calling from afar  
From out a world remote as any star.

Be this my choice, though heaven itself rain gold,  
To be in love with Nature and with God  
And keep good terms with the frail sons of men,  
And so to keep my soul. The age grows cold  
With stubble bare upon the gleaned sod,  
For time reaps treasure from the heart and pen  
In his long harvest; sheaves are lonely set;  
So much has vanished I would fain forget.

Ah, no! though much is taken much remains;  
Kings perish and their empires fall in flower;  
Love festers and the yellow idol rules;  
The world in birth-throes struggles through its  
pains

Where heroes fought and fell in their great  
hour;  
And with them died content; now futile fools  
Fight, die, and are immortal for a creed  
Which, giving all, still leaves all men in need.

Here will I dwell then by the hill-side green,  
A king imperial though the board be bare;  
For the contented heart all places shine;  
And angels on the heavenly ramparts lean  
To point the lowly to their altar stair,  
Making the hard road now a track divine  
To him whose heart burns in him by the way,  
Since love has shown him heaven in common  
day.



Norman Cross.

The most memorable poem in Mr. Norman Cross's *Songs after Sunset* (Blackwell; 3s. 6d. net) is a dramatic dialogue between David and Bathsheba. David's fascination as a singer—which must have been what Bathsheba finds it if tradition is true—is expressed thus:

*Bathsheba.* Your voice is beautiful . . . I do forget,  
Listening, I am so near a reverence;  
A pendulum between two reverences,  
—One, rich with life, the other, strange  
with death—  
A pendulum, and slowing to life's pull.

The poem is memorable, not leaving the memory after all the rest are read. But this on the Rainbow in the Cloud is more quotable:

Thou hast laid thy chains on the flood,  
Thou hast set thy curb on the sea,  
And thy bow in heaven has understood  
No more the wrack shall be.

Thou guard'st the walls of the moon,  
And the fountains of the sky,  
That not of thine anger late or soon  
A race of men shall die.

And thy storms rise up, and roar,  
And wet winds gather again;  
But the clouds that carried a curse before  
Drop . . . drop . . . in gentle rain.

Gregory Thornton.

The words of the *Sonnets of Shakespeare's Ghost* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson; 3s. 6d.) are said to have been 'procured' by Gregory Thornton, while the ornaments were made by Willem Blaeu. Shakespeare is troubled that men should say his Sonnets were not writ 'from the truth of his heart but from the toyings of his brain, and that he devised but a feigned object to fit a feigned affection': this is his answer. We quote one of the new Sonnets:

Some hold it strange that love like thine and mine

'Twixt two in state so sunder'd should be bred,  
That he who did all worths in him combine,  
Birth, beauty, wit, wealth, me thus honoured,  
Me, the poor motley, maim'd by Fortune's spite,  
Sear'd and o'erworn with tyranny of time,  
Whose wit was but the wit to learn to write  
When thou, my Muse, inspir'dst my pupil rhyme.

Thou wert the wide world's pride, but I his scorn;

His pattern thou, I his poor toy and tool;  
Whence therefore should that tender love be born

'Twixt Fortune's minion thee, and me her fool?  
O know they not that all such outward things  
Hold lowest count in the soul's reckonings?

A. J. Young.

The Poet and the Christian Minister are rarely one. The minister is likely to write 'sacred poetry,' and 'sacred poetry' refuses to be written. Yet after long waiting the unexpected comes. The author of *Boaz and Ruth* (London: Wilson, 77 Queen Street, Cheapside; 2s.) is a poet. The proof that shuts the last sceptic's mouth is the poem which gives its title to the book. One scene only in the story of Ruth is taken. It is the one difficult passage in it, the scene at the threshing-floor. It is difficult no longer; it is true and beautiful. But it is not to be quoted. There are shorter poems in the book. One of these is called

#### CREATION.

God plucked a golden quill  
From Michael's wing:  
The host that had before been still  
Began to sing.

He spread a sheet of light  
Before Him; then  
Deep down into the pot of night  
He dipped His pen.

Earth and the sea and air,  
Sun, moon and stars,  
All things of power and beauty were  
His characters.

The mighty word was penned  
Age after age;  
And, each age coming to an end,  
He turned a page.

And last, to make all sure,  
(Read it who can!)  
He set thereto His signature  
And called it Man.

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